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Abstract
The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program was created in 2000 to incentivize 
commercial investment in low-income communities that have traditionally lacked access to  
capital. In addition to its use to foster community development, after Hurricane Katrina it was 
put to use as a disaster recovery resource as part of the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act. The program 
has successfully attracted investors, but gauging the community impact of NMTC projects is 
difficult to assess because of the diversity of allowable project types and their wide dispersion 
across the country. New Orleans affords a unique opportunity to examine how NMTCs have 
contributed to a specific community because of its pre-disaster economic and post-disaster 
recovery needs, and because 40 businesses in the city have received NMTC financing through 
2008. At present, a disproportionate share of projects and dollars invested have gone to the 
Central Business District and other lightly flooded or unflooded areas.
Keywords: New Markets Tax Credits, economic development, community development, New 
Orleans, disaster recovery
vi
Introduction
In December 2000, on the final day of Congress's last session of the year, the New 
Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program was passed as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief 
Act (Bar 2002). By 2010, $25 billion of NMTC authority has been allocated1. One of the last 
initiatives of the outgoing Clinton administration, the credit, worth 39 percent of every dollar of  
equity investments made in specially qualified Community Development Entities (CDE) was 
intended to reach the “places left behind” often cited by President Clinton in statements on the 
condition of the U.S. economy, where the generally robust 1990s economy had failed to benefit 
local businesses and residents (Office of Policy Development and Research 1995). Opinions 
varied widely about why some neighborhoods failed to flourish and what should be done about 
it, but a common theme that had emerged by the mid-1990s was that insufficient access to 
investment capital for commercial development, even after the abolition of redlining and the  
passage of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), was one critical component of America’s 
inner cities’ economic woes (Barr 2002). Governmental and philanthropic grants for social 
services and business assistance could only be of so much help in revitalizing distressed 
communities if the mainstream world of finance continued to pass them by; more needed to be 
done to “democratize” financial services, in the words of Michael Barr, former deputy assistant 
secretary of the Treasury and one of the most active advocates for a tax credit that would 
improve the flow of capital into low-income communities (Barr 2002, 21). In addition to 
targeting economically distressed communities, NMTCs have been employed in disaster relief 
efforts, with a special $1 billion allocation made specifically for use in the Gulf Opportunity 
1 $25 billion of allocation authority amounts to nearly $10 billion in foregone tax revenue. The tax credit is worth 
39 percent of the amount invested; the amount of tax credit authority allocated represents the total amount of 
investments an entity can accept in return for granting the investor tax credits worth 39 percent of that 
investment. 
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Zone (GO Zone) to help meet disaster zones’ needs to attract private investment, supplementing 
grants and philanthropic aid.
The NMTC has proven popular with investors and with the CDEs that compete for 
annual tax credit authority allocations. Investors obtain tax credits by investing in a CDE, which 
in turn applies those investments by financing qualifying commercial projects in designated low-
income census tracts (or serving designated “target populations”), providing technical assistance 
to qualifying businesses, or making loans to other CDEs. Reviewing how well the program has 
performed as an investment inducement is relatively easy, but how well the program has 
performed with respect to community development is harder to judge for several reasons. First, 
as with many other economic development strategies, there is no definitive “but for” test for 
researchers that can clearly indicate whether projects might have gone forward in the absence of 
the incentive (U.S. General Accountability Office 2010). Many CDEs develop their own methods 
to identify projects that would be unlikely to occur without NMTC assistance, but those methods 
vary, and may be difficult for a researcher to corroborate after the fact (U.S. General 
Accountability Office 2010). Second, the program is still fairly young. The first round of 
allocations to CDEs was not actually made until 2003. After receiving an allocation, a CDE has 
to first find investors, and then find qualifying projects in which to invest their funds. There are 
time limits for both stages, but even so, projects resulting from NMTCs are only recently starting 
to come to fruition, and how well they will live up to expectations of jobs created or services 
performed remains to be seen. Third, with around 39 percent of the U.S.’s census tracts 
qualifying (Marples 2008), projects are widely dispersed (Gurley-Calvez et al. 2009). Fourth, the 
wide variety of projects that can be financed with the help of NMTCs mean that different 
investments may have different types of community impact, making them difficult compare. For 
instance, a community center may create few new jobs, but provide services for many in its 
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neighborhood. As more projects come to fruition, it may be possible to review the community 
impacts of similar types of businesses. Also, in areas like New Orleans that have seen a relatively 
high amount of NMTC transactions, it is beginning to be possible to examine how well NMTC 
investments are reaching areas of particular need. Questions and concerns raised in the literature 
about how well NMTC-financed transactions actually serve low-income communities and 
whether the types of investments made are skewed toward some sorts of projects more than 
others can begin to be addressed now, if not definitively answered.
This thesis will examine the data available to date on NMTC projects in New Orleans to 
see how they compare to some of the hopes, fears, and predictions raised in the literature. While 
a few case studies on individual projects scattered across the country have been conducted, case 
studies on all the investments made in a particular city are wanting (one review of three CDEs 
receiving allocations for use in Washington, D.C. was published in 2004, but at such an early 
stage there were few actual projects in progress (Jones)). New Orleans presents an interesting 
opportunity for a case study of NMTC investments because the devastation wrought by the 2005 
hurricane season introduced disaster-related investment needs to the city’s many preexisting 
“places left behind,” making it possible to review NMTCs’ performance in both respects.
I begin by describing the NMTC program itself, what its requirements are, and how it 
operates, and review the literature on the context from which the program evolved, and on the 
program in practice to date. Next, I delineate the research questions that arise from the literature 
and my research methodology, followed by results of my analysis of NMTC projects in New 
Orleans. The final section will describe my conclusions based on those results.
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The New Markets Tax Credit Program
The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC), part of a broader New Markets initiative 
developed by the Clinton administration, was passed as part of the Community Renewal Tax 
Relief Act in 2000. Although the NMTC had appeal among Republican “opportunity society” 
leaders including long-time Enterprise Zone proponent and former HUD Secretary, Jack Kamp 
(Roberts 2005; Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003), and although tax credits are considered politically 
easier to pass than direct expenditures (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003), including NMTCs in the 
act required compromise. In exchange for the inclusion of the NMTC program, as well as 
expansion of the existing Empowerment Zone program, NMTC advocates had to secure the 
support of Speaker Dennis Hastert by including the Republicans’ Renewal Communities 
program in the legislations, and ensuring the abolition of capital gains taxes (Draut, Callahan, 
and Hawkes 2002). The bill was signed at the end of Clinton’s last term, meaning that the 
particulars of the design and implementation of the program were left to the incoming Bush 
administration (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003).
The early stages of the NMTC program’s development
The authorizing legislation created a 39 percent tax credit to be taken over seven years, 
which amounts to around 30 percent of the total NMTC investment in present value terms (Barr 
2002; Lance and Kanji 2003; U.S. General Accountability Office 2002), for investments of 
business capital made in certain qualifying low-income communities. The original allocation  
authority given to the CDFI Fund, which is part of the U.S. Treasury, was $15 billion (amounting 
to $5,850,000 in foregone tax revenue). That allocation was to be spread out over the years 2001-
2007 (Lance and Kanji 2003; Marples 2008). But as the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reported in its first mandated audit of the program for Congress, “the goals [were] not 
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stated explicitly in the legislation that [authorized] the program. … It does not specify that the 
investment be new capital, that performance measures be established to show that investment 
leads to economic development, or that the investment be in high-risk areas within eligible 
communities” (2002, 1-2). Also up in the air in 2001 as the CDFI Fund began to craft the actual 
program were whether businesses should qualify by census tract or beneficiary, what amount 
would satisfy the requirement to invest “substantially all” of a Qualified Equity Investment 
(QEI) in Qualified Low-Income Community Investments (QLICI) within 12 months, and what 
should be done if a Qualified Active Low-Income Community Business (QALICB) were to 
cease to qualify or if the investment or if the investment were to be repaid in less than the seven 
years that the tax credits’ recipients capital is required to remain invested (Pinsky 2001).
To some extent, the vagueness was intentional. Tax legislation does not usually state its 
social purpose, even though it may have significant social impact (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003). 
In fact, recognition of the effect that tax policy and regulation of banks could have on the flow of 
capital into different sorts of communities was one of Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin’s reasons 
for exploring the NMTC idea (Kellogg 2002). A relative paucity of specific goals or standards 
was intended to serve a second purpose, according to at least one of the active participants in 
drafting the program, Cliff Kellogg. Kellogg told attendees of an NMTC conference that 
“because private investors have their capital at risk, there should be fewer program reporting 
requirements, and the ultimate oversight on investment strategies should be in the hands of those 
investors. … We did not intend for the CDFI Fund to negotiate an involved Allocation 
Agreement, or impose burdensome reporting requirements. The goal was to put money on the 
street in poor communities” (Kellogg 2002, 10 – 11).
Vagueness in the legislation meant that the specifics of the actual program were 
developed under a somewhat ambivalent administration. Bush’s newly appointed CDFI Fund 
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director, Tony Brown, spoke well of NMTCs, which the administration considered primarily a 
jobs program (Roberts 2005). Bush’s administration showed less support for NMTCs than 
Clinton’s however (Rubn and Stankiewicz 2003), and tellingly, proposed a $68 million budget 
for the CDFI Fund for fiscal year 2002—reduced from $118 in 2001. Ultimately, their 2002 
budget was $80 million (Barr 2002; Pinsky 2001), which limited the agency’s ability to develop 
and manage the program early on (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005). In 2004, the U.S. Treasury 
Department described the NMTC program as specifically “an initiative useful for stimulating 
overall U.S. economic growth,” shifting its emphasis away from low-income community 
development (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005). In 2002, though, Kellogg noted that he was pleased 
that it appeared that, despite the early support for New Markets coming mainly from Democrats, 
“the NMTC [looked] like it [would] survive the hand-off from a Democratic to a Republican 
Administration,” and that the ideas underlying it could easily have originated “on the other side 
of the aisle” (Kellogg 2002, 4).
The CDFI Fund established its NMTC award process, and was able to make its first 
allocations in March 2003, when it awarded the allocations intended for both 2001 and 2002 
(Jones 2004). The first competition for allocations had concluded in December 2002, but the 
actual tax credit authority had not been awarded yet to the winning CDEs (CDFI Fund 2008b). 
The process of awarding NMTC authority to CDEs is more or less the same today, with some 
adjustments to the scoring procedures.
CDEs and the NMTC allocation process
“Community Development Entities,” or CDEs, are organizations certified by the CDFI 
Fund to be eligible to compete for a portion of each round’s allocation of tax credit authority. In 
addition to annual allocations, there have been special one-time additional allocations as part of  
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the GO Zone and American Recovery and Reinvestment Acts. The primary criteria for 
certification as a CDE are that the entity must:
• “Be a legally established entity and a domestic corporation or partnership for Federal tax 
purposes;
• “Have a primary mission of serving or providing investment capital to LICs [Low-
Income Communities] or Low-Income Persons; and
• “Establish accountability to LICs through representation on it’s [sic] governing or 
advisory board” (CDFI Fund 2009c, 4).
To satisfy the requirement of having a primary mission of serving LICs, an applicant 
must demonstrate that at least 60 percent of its activities and 60 percent of its products are 
targeted to LICs and Low-Income Persons. Both for-profit and nonprofit entities can become 
CDEs, but a nonprofit CDE must control at least one for-profit subsidiary CDE, and transfer all 
of its allocation authority to that subsidiary. For-profit CDEs provide investors tax credits up to 
the amount they are awarded in exchange for stock or capital interest. CDEs must designate a 
primary service area, which can range from a single county to nationwide. To show that it 
maintains accountability to the LIC it serves, a CDE must demonstrate to the CDFI Fund that at  
least 20 percent of its governing or advisory board(s) is representative of the LICs in its service 
area. Qualities that indicate “representativeness” include residence in an LIC, small business 
ownership in the community, employment or board membership of a nonprofit or community 
organization active in the service area, or otherwise representing the interests of the LIC or LICs 
in question. CDEs that intend to serve a statewide area or larger must show that their LIC 
representatives make up a cross-section of the LICs in their service area, which may require 
multiple advisory boards (CDFI Fund 2009c). Organizations already certified as CDFIs or 
Specialized Small Business Investment Companies by the Small Business Administration 
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automatically qualify as CDEs, and need only register with the CDFI Fund to be counted among 
CDEs eligible to apply for NMTC allocations. (CDFI Fund 2009a).
Once certified as a CDE, an organization can submit an application proposal for NMTC 
authority whenever a Notice of Allocation Availability is published in the Federal Register  
(CDFI Fund 2009c). In its proposal, the CDE must specify the dollar amount of tax credit 
authority it is seeking, and information related to the four primary categories by which 
applications are scored: Business Strategy, Community Impact, Management Capacity, and 
Capitalization Strategy. Applicants must also supply evidence of their track record of past 
activities and community impact, and describe their projected activities (CDFI Fund 2009b).  
Each of the four main categories is worth up to 25 points, with an additional ten points available 
in the second round of scoring for demonstrating a track record of serving LICs, or committing 
to make investments in projects owned by unrelated parties. Three readers, chosen for their 
knowledge of community and economic development finance as well as business and real estate 
finance, score each application independently. Applicants who receive a minimum aggregate 
score in the four primary categories go on to the second round, in which a CDFI Fund panel 
decides what size award the application warrants. The awards are made beginning with the 
highest-scoring applicant, and continue until that round’s total allocation authority is expended. 
The application process has been highly competitive since the program’s beginning 
(Armistead 2005b; Garcia 2005; Roberts 2005). More than 1,950 CDEs were certified within 
four years (Garcia 2005), and the total amount of allocations requested by CDEs from 2002 to 
2007 was eight times the available authority (CDFI Fund 2008b). The competitiveness has 
assuaged some fears that the vagueness of the program’s goals and relatively low eligibility 
thresholds for LICs and QALICBs would lead to a preponderance of projects located in areas 
that are only nominally low income, and poorly serve low-income individuals’ needs. To raise 
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their application scores, many CDEs have been promising in their allocation agreements (based 
on their applications) to serve communities in greater need than the NMTC statue requires 
(Armistead 2005b; Garcia 2005; Roberts 2005). Awardees are held to the terms they have 
stipulated in their applications, even if other activities would technically satisfy NMTC 
requirements2 (CDFI Fund 2009b). The CDFI Fund monitors compliance through data systems, 
and sometimes site visits. Institution Level Reports (ILR) and Transaction Level Reports (TLR) 
are required of CDEs, documenting how they have made their investments and data about 
specific projects. Combined, the ILR and TLR make up the Community Investment Impact 
System (CIIS), which went into effect May 2004. The New Markets Compliance Monitoring 
System (NMCMS) combines data from the CIIS and three other data tracking systems. The 
NMCMS went into effect in April 2005, just in time to examine the first round of allocatees’ 
compliance3 (U.S. General Accountability Office 2007).
Qualified investments
After being awarded an allocation of tax credit authority, CDEs seek investors to make 
QEIs in exchange for the credit against their income tax. In turn, the CDEs apply those funds to 
Qualified Low-Income Community Investments (QLICI). A QLICI can be an investment in a 
qualified business (QALICB), a commercial real estate improvement, financial counseling for 
qualified businesses, or the purchase of a loan from another CDE.
2 For example, if a CDE indicates on its application that it intends to make its Qualified Low-Income Community 
Investments (QLICI) in census tracts with greater than 30 percent poverty, it cannot make investments in census 
tracts with lower poverty rates even if they are NMTC-eligible. Similarly, committing to offering below-market 
interest rates, making a minimum percentage of investments in non-metropolitan census tracts, investing in 
unrelated entities, and other promises to go beyond program requirements to benefit LICs can earn CDEs higher 
scores, but also preclude investments in projects that would otherwise be eligible.
3 As of January 2007, out of 179 CDEs that had received NMTC allocations, only nine had been identified by the 
CDFI Fund as being out of compliance with their allocation agreements, and one out of compliance with the 
“substantially all” requirement. Of those, one CDE had its allocation revoked and another returned its allocation 
voluntarily. The CDFI Fund worked with the rest to bring them back into compliance (U.S. General 
Accountability Office 2007).
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To qualify for a QLICI, a business must either be located in a designated census tract, or 
in some cases, serve a specially designated “Targeted Population.” To be considered a Low-
Income Community eligible for NMTC investments, a census tract must have either a poverty 
rate of at least 20 percent, or a median family income below 80 percent of the metropolitan area 
median (in the case of non-metropolitan census tracts, median income must be below 80 percent 
of the statewide non-metropolitan median). In practice, because of the competitiveness of the 
application process, many CDEs have committed to exceeding the program’s minimum LIC 
requirements. In a study covering NMTC project data from 2002 to 2007, the CDFI Fund found 
that “over 75 percent of NMTC-financed projects were located in census tracts that met one or 
more of the following distress criteria: 1) a poverty rate of at least 30 percent; 2) a median family 
income at or below 60 percent of the applicable area median income; or 3) an unemployment rate 
at least 1.5 times the national average” (CDFI Fund 2008b, I).
Until 2004, the Secretary of the Treasury could designate additional “Targeted Areas” that 
did not meet either of the above criteria, but had inadequate access to investment capital in a  
contiguous area that was not bound by a census tract. After 2004, Congress defined three new 
LIC categories: 1) high out-migration rural county census tracts, 2) low-population tracts that are 
within Empowerment Zone, and 3) “Targeted Populations” (CDFI Fund 2008a).
The Targeted Populations category permits investments in QALICBs that are not located 
within NMTC-eligible census tracts, as long as they meet one or more minimum requirements of 
serving, employing, or being owned by members of an eligible population4. Two Targeted 
4 To satisfy the income requirement, at least 50 percent of a QALICB’s gross income must come from transactions 
with members of the Targeted Population being served; to satisfy the employment condition, at least 40 percent 
of a QALICB’s employees must be members of the Targeted Population; and to satisfy the ownership condition, 
at least 50 percent of the QALICB must be owned by Targeted Population members. In addition, some 
geographic restrictions remain. To serve the Low-Income Targeted Population (LITP), a business must be located  
in a census tract below 120 percent of AMI, and to serve the GO Zone Targeted Population (GZTP), a business  
must be within a census tract designated as flooded or damaged by FEMA and not exceed 200 percent AMI 
(CDFI FUND 2008a).
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Populations have been designated: 1) the Low-Income Targeted Population (LITP), comprised of 
individuals whose family income is below 80 percent of the area median, and 2) the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone Targeted Population (GZTP), comprised of individuals whose principal 
residences or sources of employment were lost due to Hurricane Katrina. Service to the GZTP 
(for investments that would not qualify on any other basis) is limited to CDEs that received 
NMTCs from the special $1 billion of allocation authority established by the GO Zone act of 
2005 dedicated to recovery and redevelopment of areas damaged by Hurricane Katrina (CDFI 
Fund 2008a). The Targeted Population category has been difficult to use in practice because it is 
poorly defined. If audited, a CDE must demonstrate that it had a “reasonable expectation” that a  
QALICB would continue to serve (or employ, or be owned by) members of the targeted 
population for the duration of the investment, but what sort of data satisfies the reasonableness 
test is not defined. Should the IRS determine that a QALICB did not meet the reasonable 
expectation requirement, the tax credits would be subject to recapture and penalties, making 
CDEs and their investors wary of the increased risk associated with QALICBs outside approved 
census tracts (Reaman and Hoopengardner 2009, U.S. General Accountability Office 2007). As 
of 2007, at the CDFI Fund had referred at least one CDE case to the IRS, but that case was for 
failing the “substantially all” test, and the CDE was able to correct the problem within the time 
allotted, preventing recapture (U.S. General Accountability Office 2007).
Apart from Targeted Populations, geography is the primary determinant of what 
constitutes a QALICB; minimum levels of service to, employment of, or ownership by low-
income individuals is not required. The Internal Revenue Code 45D(d)(2)(A) defines a QALICB 
as one in which at least 50 percent of the total gross income is derived from active conduct 
within an LIC, a substantial portion of its tangible property is located in an LIC, and a substantial 
portion of its services take place in an LIC. The code also allows that rental of real property in an 
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LIC may be considered a qualifying business if it is not residential rental property, and there are 
substantial improvements to the property (residential rental property can only qualify if it makes 
up less than 80 percent of a mixed-use development’s income). Several other types of businesses 
are prohibited as well, including golf courses, gambling facilities, liquor stores, country clubs, 
massage parlors, hot tub facilities, suntan facilities, and large farming operations (Jones 2004; 
Lance and Kanji 2003; Marples 2008).
NMTC investors
The NMTC has been popular with investors as well as CDEs. Former CDFI Fund 
Director Andrew Garcia reported higher than initially expected investor interest (Garcia 2005). 
At the end of 2007, approximately 94 percent of the first round of tax credits allocated had been 
claimed, 86 percent from the second round, and 75 percent of the first four rounds combined had 
already been claimed (CDFI Fund 2008b). By 2004, investors were paying between $0.70 and 
$0.80 per dollar of credit. By comparison, it took five years for Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits (LIHTC) to reach that level (Armistead 2005b). The price for NMTCs has declined since 
the housing market collapse and credit crisis beginning in 2008, however, with several CDE 
representatives reporting prices between $0.65 and $0.70 since then, and at least one CDE selling 
NMTCs for as low as $0.51 per dollar of credit (U.S. General Accountability Office 2010). 
Nevertheless, current program director Donna Gambrell has noted that between September 2008 
and June 2009, close to $2 billion has been invested in CDEs, indicating that even in difficult 
economic times the NMTC program is still strong (2009).
Popularity with investors raises the question of how the incentive is affecting investor 
behavior, namely, to what extent is the NMTC program attracting new capital, shifting 
investment from higher-income to lower-income communities, or simply rewarding investors for 
choices they would have made anyway. Two recent studies of NMTC investor behavior 
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determined that among individual investors, there were statistically significant differences in  
wealth and assets between NMTC investors and otherwise similar non-NMTC investors, 
suggesting that the NMTC induced new investments from reducing personal consumption, rather 
than simply shifting capital from other investments (Gurley-Calvez et al. 2009; U.S. General 
Accountability Office 2007). Individuals contribute a very small share of QEIs, however (no 
more than five percent of attributable investments through 2006); corporations make up a much 
larger proportion of QEIs (at least 60 percent through 2006) (Gurley-Calvez et al. 2009). There is 
no evidence to suggest that the NMTC has led corporations to increase their overall investments, 
but a GAO survey suggested that it is most likely that more corporate investment has been 
moved from higher-income to lower-income communities as a result of the program (Gurley-
Calvez et al. 2009; U.S. General Accountability Office 2007). Even if the program has induced 
very little new investment, the GAO report notes that shifted investments could still be 
considered a program success, because they represent new capital available to LICs, even if not 
new capital altogether (2007). Eighty-eight percent of investors surveyed by the GAO said that 
they would not have made the same investment without the NMTC, and of those, 75 percent said 
they would not have made a similar investment in the same community. Sixty-four percent of 
investors reported that they increased their investments in low-income communities because of 
the NMTC (Gambrell 2009, U.S. General Accountability Office 2007). The GAO found, 
however, that two-thirds of investors had a track record of investing in low-income communities, 
and that government regulation compliance may be one of the primary motivations for some 
investors, as NMTC investments can satisfy Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements 
(U.S. General Accountability Office 2007).
The CDFI Fund estimates that for every dollar of tax revenue forgone because of the 
NMTC, $14 of investments are induced in LICs (CDFI Fund 2008b). While there are strong 
13
indications of the program’s success in attracting investors and channeling investments to CDEs, 
questions about how well the QLICIs being made actually serve LICs and their residents are still 
being raised in the literature on NMTCs.
Inspirations and origins of the NMTC
Early government attempts to promote access to capital 
One of the great innovations of the NMTC program is that it combines the features of a 
competitive grant program with the advantages of private sector investment and decision 
making. Most Federal tax credits are simply claimed by taxpayers rather than 
competitively allocated, and most community development programs of comparable size 
to the NMTC program are administered through formula-funding mechanisms (Gambrell 
2009, 5).
The creation of a program to increase access to private capital in low-income 
communities, channeled neither through government agencies nor individual investors, but 
instead by financial institutions specializing in community development has several roots, some 
going back at least four decades. Significant factors that provide context for the genesis of the 
NMTC include: 1) changes in banking and financing; 2) desires to reduce government 
involvement in the direct provision of social services out of ideology, financial constraints, or 
both; and 3) growing recognition of the “new” markets for financial products and goods and 
services among minorities, women, and inner-city neighborhoods.
The Clinton administration announced in the 1995 that “‘A rising tide lifts all boats’ is a 
nice aphorism, but an insufficient urban policy” (Office of Policy Development and Research 
1995, 29). It was not a new concept though, that not all communities shared equally in times of 
prosperity, nor that full inclusion in America’s economy—encompassing access to financing as 
well as access to job, housing, and education—was a critical component of social justice and 
civil rights. A number of African-American-owned banks emerged in the 1880s to serve their 
own communities, and many of the credit unions that emerged in the 1930s and 1940s were 
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located in the rural south with missions of serving African-Americans who had no access to 
credit elsewhere, to give just two examples (Benjamin, Rubin, and Zielenbach 2004). Federal 
policy had also attempted to address unequal access to capital before the 1990s. Michael 
Harrington’s argument in The Other America that many citizens were structurally excluded from 
the mainstream economy had influenced President Kennedy to make access to economic 
resources part of his contribution to civil rights, for instance (Pinsky 2001). Federal programs 
following Kennedy’s death that channeled resources through state and local governments 
typically failed to reach their targets (Pinsky 2001). In his influential “The Competitive 
Advantage of Inner Cities” (1995), Michael Porter disdained most of the federal government’s 
attempts to bring more capital access to inner cities, like government loan pools and quasi-public 
lending organizations, accusing them of siphoning off money from more worthwhile uses due to 
their fragmentation, costly overhead, and bureaucratic nature.
The creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1965 as part of the War on Poverty 
brought federal resources to chronically impoverished areas with workforce training and the 
Community Action Program for both economic and community development. Later, passage of 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1974, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 1975, and the 
CRA in 1977 were important steps more specifically toward opening banking and financial 
service to all communities, but roadblocks to affordable financing for inner-city businesses 
persisted (Pinsky 2001). Two factors that especially hindered the CRA’s effectiveness were the 
lack of meaningful enforcement prior to Clinton’s election in 1992, and the rise of the Cash 
Management Account through the 1970s and 1980s. “In 1977, approximately two-thirds of 
America’s long-term savings (including investments) were in banks and other insured institutions 
in accounts that were subject to CRA,” but by 2001, only around one quarter of America’s 
savings were in CRA-subject accounts (Pinsky 2001, 29). Pinsky’s history of the growth of 
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community development finance, including the growth of CDFIs in particular, tracks the 
responses to changes in banking and social policy alike that failed low-income communities. A 
handful of early community development corporations (CDCs) experimented with financing and 
saw some success, laying the foundation for community development finance. Early CDFIs often 
relied on religious institutions willing to put their capital at risk for the sake of social goals that  
their faiths supported. Although their efforts frequently failed, some of the religious 
denominations responded to failure by fostering better-skilled CDFIs, rather than declaring 
defeat. Pinsky also credits the campaign to divest from companies doing business with South 
Africa in protest of its Apartheid policy with adding impetus to the idea of aligning capital with 
social values.
Community Development Financial Institutions
CDFIs began to truly flourish in the 1990s. Changing CRA regulations to permit 
investments in CDFIs as qualifying activities was one reason (Pinsky 2001), and establishment 
of the CDFI Fund within the Department of the Treasury with the passage of the Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 was another (Gambrell 
2009). By 2001, the CDFI Fund was the largest single source of funding for CDFIs. The Fund 
also raised the visibility and credibility of the industry. In 2000, when the NMTC legislation was 
passed, at least 550 CDFIs across the country were managing $6 billion in assets, and were all 
pre-qualified to register as CDEs if they chose (Pinsky 2001).
While a CDE must have a primary mission of serving LICs, its parent organization need 
not. NMTC legislation was deliberately crafted to not restrict participation in the program to 
organizations with a strictly community development mission because the drafters felt that the 
amount of capital potentially involved was too great to be handled exclusively by such 
organizations. They also hoped that increasing the involvement of more traditional financial  
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service providers would lead to their greater involvement in distressed communities on an 
ongoing basis (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003). The Clinton administration’s NMTC crafters were 
not alone in their concert that existing, strictly mission-driven CDFIs would not have the 
capacity to manage the capital involved by themselves: “substantial flows [of capital] without  
commensurate, targeted development services to build the capacity of borrowers and strategic 
management to keep CDFIs on track have consistently produced negative results in these 
markets … Fortunately, capital attracts talent” (Pinsky 2001, 16). Even though successful CDFIs 
were one of several sources of inspiration for the NMTC program (Armistead 2005a; Kellogg 
2002), one of its priorities was to attract the financial talents of the private sector. It was also 
intended to build relationships between more conventional capital providers and investors on the 
one hard, and nonprofit organizations service LICs on the other (Kellogg 2002). The boom in 
both CDFIs and CDCs as well—which have gone from around 200 in the 1970s to around 3,600 
by 1997—meant that there were already many experienced community development 
organizations for conventional investors to partner with (Roberts 2005).
Market Failure
The notion that market failure was responsible for investors’ neglect of inner cities and 
other economically distressed areas was gaining ascendancy in the 1990s. Although many of 
Michael Porter’s suggestions to remedy both social problems and lack of capital in inner cities 
were controversial, he made a compelling case that purchasing power in America’s central cities 
was vastly underestimated, as was their residents’ capacity to make a good workforce (Porter 
1995). The work of Shorebank in Chicago, Social Compact in Washington, D.C., and other 
market analyses reviewed by the NMTC program developers confirmed the purchasing capacity 
of inner cities (Kellogg 2002). Porter’s ideas were a specific influence on the development of the 
NMTC (Kellogg 2002), and Porter had personal contact with both the President and Vice-
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President during the development of the New Markets initiatives, even though he did not 
ultimately agree with all of the administration’s prescriptions to bring capital to inner cities  
(Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003). “The NMTC was designed to overcome market failures resulting 
from investors’ lack of market information,” Kellogg wrote (2005, 53), as well as to overcome 
such disadvantages as “high cost of land assembly, redeveloping obsolete infrastructure, and 
developing in an urban environment rather than a greenfield” (53). “We aspired to make capital 
markets work more perfectly. … We did not want to subsidize QALICBs that were 
fundamentally uncompetitive” (Kellogg 2002, 7-8). The goal of alleviation of poverty was not 
dismissed, but economic justifications for intervention were being introduced.
Mere myopia on the part of mainstream institutions regarding opportunities in inner cities 
cannot be blamed alone for failure to make more investments in distressed areas, or investments 
with more affordable terms than the ones typically being offered. Market failure from other 
standpoints was an early justification for the creation of “Business Development Financial 
Institutions” (BDFI), as Caskey and Hollister (2001) have termed CDFI-type institutions that 
specialize in financing commercial activity, as opposed to focusing mainly on housing. An early 
assumption was that savvy BDFI directors would be able to identify the good deals that others 
could not see in communities that had been written off by most as unprofitable, and actually 
make a market return on their investments. “Across the country, there is now sufficient 
experience with BDFIs to refute this belief,” Caskey and Hollister (2001, 5) determined. It may 
be the case that some banks mistakenly overlook inner-city potential, but BDFIs regularly earn 
below-market returns (Caskey and Hollister 2001). This finding conflicts somewhat with 
Pinsky’s history of CDFI development. He found that by the late 1990s, banks that had one time 
financed or funded CDFIs were beginning to compete with them directly for some of the deals 
that once would have been strictly the provenance of CDFIs. Pinsky attributes this at least in part 
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to the prime credit market saturation pushing banks to look further downstream. For the social 
goals of the CDFI movement, it is a success of sorts for conventional banks to take over projects 
that were once “untouchable,” but it has kept CDFIs confined largely to below-market projects. 
Childcare centers and charter schools were two new areas “just outside the margins of banks” 
that CDFIs looked to as banks moved into their other territories (Pinsky 2001, 13-14).
Even though the argument that it was market failure from a financial standpoint for 
conventional lenders to overlook distressed areas has not proven very strong, market failure from 
an economic standpoint, incorporating hard-to-quantify benefits to society in addition to private 
financial returns, remains a plausible rationale for intervention (Caskey and Hollister 2001). 
Pinsky’s assertion that one of the reasons that CDFIs emerge is to intermediate between 
“unconventional customers and markets” and the mainstream economy is that “the sources of 
capital have limited knowledge of the user market and/or the transaction costs are prohibitive” is  
still valid (Pinsky 2001, 5). One of the key concerns about the performance of NMTCs is that 
for-profit CDEs may invest differently—and less effectively from a community development 
standpoint—than nonprofit CDEs, because for-profit institutions lack knowledge of community 
needs and continue to serve a more mainstream “user market.” Also, prohibitive transaction costs 
of doing business in inner cities is a well-documented impediment to improving capital access 
there. “Even in the best of circumstances, small-business lending is only marginally profitable to 
banks because transaction costs are high relative to loan amounts,” Porter wrote (1995, 64), 
recommending tax exclusions for capital gains and dividends as one way to offset those costs to 
lenders and investors. Preference programs based on economic needs instead of on categories 
like race, ethnicity, or gender should offset the high costs of lending in inner cities, of acquiring 
land that is more expensive than suburban greenfields, of waiting through long permitting 
processes, and of other special impediments to inner-city business development. Kellogg 
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identified some of the barriers to capital flow that the NMTC program developers considered 
especially important: 1) high underwriting costs, 2) difficulty assembling management teams, 3) 
high operating costs that reduce revenue prospects, 4) competition with greenfields with no need 
of environmental remediation, and 5) competition with suburban tax abatements and other 
incentives (Kellogg 2002). Ironically, one of the criticisms frequently levied against the NMTC 
program is that high transaction costs associated with NMTC compliance may limit the types of 
projects that can be financed.
“Third Way” innovations
Evidence that the private sector could partner successfully with government and 
nonprofits in complementary ways—when the right incentives could be found—helped inspire 
the NMTC program. Recourse to social policy that put a premium on public-private partnerships 
was also politically appealing to the Clinton administration. Clinton self-consciously distanced 
himself from Democratic social programs of the past, while also rejecting Republican 
retrenchment from social spending. His draft Urban Policy Report of 1995 stated that “the 
Community Empowerment Agenda charts a new course beyond the old way of big government 
and the new rage of no government” (Office of Policy Development and Research 1995, 7). The 
report notes that “[t]he experience of the 1980s demonstrates that a growing economy does not 
automatically raise all incomes” (2), and recommends targeting public investments to reconnect  
poor neighborhoods to the opportunities to be found in their more prosperous surroundings, and 
leveraging private investment to “ensure the availability of private capital to central city  
neighborhoods, where it is desperately needed to fuel business creation and growth” (5).
The primary economic development programs being touted by the Clinton administration 
in its Urban Policy Report of 1995 were its Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities. 
Spatially targeted and providing tax incentives to businesses that located in designated zones and 
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employed zone residents, the two programs grew out of the dozens of state Enterprise Zone 
programs and similar policies formerly promoted mainly by Republicans. Unlike many 
Republican-sponsored Enterprise Zone-type programs, Empowerment Zones and Enterprise 
Communities added grants for community planning and social services.
State governments led the way with Enterprise Zones in the 1980s, when attempts to pass 
federal EZ legislation failed to bear fruit. State and local governments have often led the way on 
other innovations in economic development as well. In addition to Porter’s “Competitive 
Advantage,” two works that were specifically cited as influential by members of the NMTC 
development team are Peter Eisinger’s 1988 The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State and David 
Osborne’s 1990 Laboratories of Democracy. Eisinger chronicled the movement of many state 
governments from reliance on supply-side location incentives for economic development to 
diverse and inventive demand-side policies. Although in some respects the NMTC is a supply-
side strategy, luring capital to designated areas, the name “New Markets” itself represents the 
recognition that the country was full of unmet demand. Ideally, low-income communities could 
simultaneously benefit from a supply- and demand-side approach. Bill Clinton’s tenure as 
governor of Arkansas was the subject of one chapter of Osborne’s Laboratories. Clinton’s 
promotion of education is especially emphasized in the chapter, but his efforts to shift the state’s 
industrial recruitment-oriented economic development policy to one with a greater emphasis on 
small business development and community development are also noted, as is Clinton’s 
encouragement of investing public pension funds in Arkansas businesses. Interestingly, the 
eventual proponent of the Third Way proved too liberal for Arkansas’ tastes in his first term as 
governor, and alienated the state’s business interests.
A particularly important federal policy innovation that influenced the genesis of the New 
Markets approaches was the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), created under the Tax 
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Reform Act of 1986. The LIHTC’s success at forging partnerships between a variety of private, 
public, and nonprofit actors in housing development was one factor that inspired a tax credit 
approach to catalyze other types of investment in low income areas (Armistead 2005b; Jones 
2004; Roberts 2005). “An important legacy of [LIHTC] work was more than just the buildings it 
built; it was the highly sophisticated system of private investors, nonprofit and profit-motivated 
developers, and state and local governments, who had the experience and relationships that 
would be essential to a successful economic development effort” (Roberts 2005, 24). At the same 
time, however, the Tax Reform Act made real estate investment less lucrative for high-income 
professionals by restricting their uses as tax shelters.
The potential of tax credit programs to benefit communities while at the same time 
imposing market discipline on community development and ideally have a less-intrusive 
economic effect than other types of government assistance was a virtue for Third Way Democrats 
(Kellogg 2002; Roberts 2005). A previous CDC Tax Credit pilot program had also shown some 
promise, as had the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Armistead 2005b; Roberts 2005). 
It did not hurt the NMTC concept, of course, that both private sector involvement and tax credit 
programs tend to have bi-partisan appeal (Jones 2004; Roberts 2005; Rubin and Stankiewicz 
2003). “CED [Community Economic Development] scholars observe that tax credit programs 
tend to enjoy bi-partisan support and are more attractive to conservative legislators as they are 
tax cuts as opposed to tax and spend programs” (Jones 2004, 233).
From the left, important support came from Reverend Jesse Jackson, who was then 
promoting his Wall Street Project to encourage more private investment in inner-city and 
minority communities (Roberts 2005). Jackson joined President Clinton on his 1999 New 
Markets Tour of several impoverished urban and rural communities (Rubin and Stankiewicz 
2003). Also on the left, over 100 community developers and organizers formed the Community 
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Development Tax Credit Coalition to advocate the program (Armistead 2005b; Roberts 2005; 
Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005).
Proponents on the left and right, and in the private, nonprofit, and public sectors, could 
agree that access to capital was one of low-income America’s critical problems, and that a tax 
credit to improve rates of return on investments in businesses and nonprofits in areas where 
affordable financing terms were hard to obtain was a promising policy. Accepting the NMTC, 
however, did not end the debates about what the goals of the program ought to be—poverty 
alleviation, job creation, or place-based revitalization, for instance—and whether it has been 
achieving them.
Practical NMTC issues
The literature on the NMTC program in practice revolves around the questions of what its 
proper goals are or should be, and what its strengths and weaknesses are relative to those goals. 
Sometimes the same project can be the subject of a resounding success story in one article, and a 
case of abject failure in another. For instance, the conversion of an old armory in downtown 
Portland, Oregon into a performance venue, The Portland Center Stage Company, is praised as 
an excellent example of the potential of NMTCs for revitalization in Stevens and Schon (2005), 
but appears on the list of worst abuses of the NMTC for Groves5 (2007).
Who benefits?
For most of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, tension has existed in 
economic development programs between the pursuit of broad-based growth on the one hand, 
and targeted poverty alleviation strategies on the other. The NMTC program as it has been 
5 Groves sees NMTC projects like performing arts centers as subsidizing gentrification, catering to the wants of 
middle- and upper-income individuals rather than to the needs of low-income communities. To Stevens and 
Schon, the armory’s conversion represents a successful public-private partnership that reuses a long-vacant  
historic building, and stands to draw more visitors downtown.
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implemented has been no exception (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003). The notion that targeted 
poverty alleviation was a specific goal of NMTCs is supported by the Clinton administration’s 
promotion of its New Markets initiatives on a “poverty tour,” and its emphasis on combating 
“pockets of poverty.” “The President, along with business leaders, toured a number of high-
profile poor communities and the language of the speeches and media coverage focused on 
making capital available to businesses in poor communities. That led supporters of business 
lending and investing to have high hopes that the NMTC would be a tool for them” (Armistead 
2005a). Clinton also argued, though, that the NMTC was a way to maintain America’s economic 
growth overall without inflation, by tapping into the new markets the tax credit aimed to reach 
(Roberts 2005). Sill, “[m]any of the drafters of the New Markets Tax Credit legislation intended 
the program to focus on poverty alleviation, and hoped that the program would be designed in 
such a way as to maximize the developmental impact of the tax credits on low-income 
communities” (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005, 4). The GAO’s first report to Congress on the 
program acknowledges that “according to congressional supporters of the legislation, the 
program’s goals are to direct new business capital to low-income communities, facilitate 
economic development in these communities, and encourage investment in high-risk areas,” but 
that those goals are not stated in the authorizing legislation (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office 2002, 1). Without explicit expression of its intent, “it could be that Congress intended to 
benefit whoever desired to move into low-income areas, or rather the low-income residents and 
its existing businesses, or those equity investors who receive the tax credit. The answer could be 
all of the above” (Groves 2007, 220). Real estate developers, banks, and financiers are others 
who stand to benefit from the credit.
Regardless of intent, one of the four most persistent criticisms Armistead found of the 
NMTC program in his research was that “the program, which is targeted to low-income 
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communities, defines low-income communities too broadly and so fails to concentrate 
investment in the neediest areas while also putting rural areas at a disadvantage (Armistead 
2005a, 13). In fact, downtown business districts often qualify for QLICIs because their sparse 
residential population is largely impoverished. For example, prior to the 2000 Census, Wall 
Street would have been considered a low-income community for NMTC purposes (Rubin and 
Stankiewicz 2003).
Concern that LICs are defined too broadly may be mitigated somewhat by the 
competitiveness of the allocation rounds, which encourages CDEs to commit to limiting their  
investments to census tracts in higher distress than the program requires. Nevertheless, what 
sorts of projects CDEs choose to undertake in those tracts may or may not be what the local 
community would like to see. A commentator told Armistead, “The best thing about the credit is  
that you can use it for practically anything; the problem with the credit is that you can use it for  
practically anything” (Armistead 2005b, 10). Assuming the primary intent of the NMTC truly is 
poverty alleviation, Groves (2007) questions the numerous investments subsidizing “performing 
arts centers for opera, ballet, symphony orchestras, hotels, high priced condominiums, theaters, 
mixed use commercial developments, and even convention centers” (216). He dubs such 
investments “Problematic Purposed Projects,” on the grounds that they primarily serve middle- 
and upper-income consumers who already have the access to capital that low-income individuals 
lack, and proposes that the NMTC legislation be amended to prohibit them, along with the “sin” 
businesses already ineligible (e.g. golf courses, gambling facilities, liquor stores, etc.). Groves 
goes further to propose that the list of acceptable NMTC projects in any given community be 
determined by that community—that the community compile a “Mall of Needs” for CDEs and 
developers to choose from (Groves gives examples like grocery stores, or health clinics that 
target illnesses prevalent in the community), as opposed to a “Mall of Wants,” as he categorizes 
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projects that tend to serve gentrifiers (2007, 236-7). Groves did not have a complete list of 
NMTC projects from the four rounds of allocations that had transpired when he did his research, 
but of those projects that he was able to identify, he found that “approximately $2 billion of tax 
credit subsidy [had] been allocated to projects that [appeared] to be designed primarily for those 
already with the very access to capital that the low-income residents lack” (2007, 226).
CDE parent organizations and investment priorities
One of Groves’ concerns regarding the prevalence of “Mall of Wants” projects is that 
investors’ interest in profits are not always being adequately balanced with communities’ 
interests in their own benefits. All CDEs must take into account the financial viability of projects  
they invest in; as Kellogg emphasized, the program was not intended to subsidize 
“fundamentally uncompetitive” endeavors. Others have shared concerns like Groves’ since the 
program’s inception, and have specifically warned that the nature of a CDE’s parent entity—for-
profit, public, or nonprofit—could influence its decision-making, and that for-profit CDEs in 
particular may place financial returns over social benefit. Rubin and Stankiewicz (2005) found 
numerous studies comparing for-profit and nonprofit providers in other industries that 
consistently show that the for-profit entities studied base their decisions on their profit objective, 
regardless of the social consequences of that decision. As of 2005, there was not enough 
evidence to determine whether there were significant differences between the types of QALICBs 
chosen by for-profit, nonprofit, and public CDEs. At that time, Armistead (2005b) found 
anecdotal evidence that investment patterns were similar among for-profits and nonprofits6, but 
additional transaction data since 2005 could demonstrate whether that has held true or not. As 
6 Most of the discussion of the nature of CDEs’ parent organizations revolves around for-profit and nonprofit, or 
for-profit and mission-driven organizations (CDFIs can be for- or nonprofit, but tend to be grouped with 
nonprofits as “mission-driven”), but public entities can for CDEs as well. According to data from all the 
allocation rounds through 2007, government-controlled entities made up 11.2% of NMTC applicants, and 11.4% 
of NMTC recipients (CDFI Fund 2008b).
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Armistead argues, “the important question for advocates of community-based development is not 
who gets the allocation, but whether or not their constituents’ projects receive capital 
investment” (Armistead 2005a, 19). If it does prove true that for-profit CDEs put more emphasis 
on profitability than community interests relative to more mission-driven nonprofit or public 
CDEs, it raises questions about CDEs’ application scoring procedures, namely the relative 
weights given to the different strengths measured. Rubin and Stankiewicz (2005) found that for 
at least the first two rounds, the scoring system favored CDEs that were able to self-finance by 
virtue of for-profit parent entities providing their own capital in exchange for the credits, thus 
raising their CDEs’ Capitalization Strategy scores. A related problem that Rubin and Stankiewicz 
(2005) found was that the CDEs are permitted to demonstrate their ability to raise capital through 
non-binding letters of intent, raising the possibility that CDEs without substantial funding of 
their own would be induced to offer their potential investors more profit- than community-
oriented deals to secure their commitment. To remedy the possibility that for-profit CDEs will  
sacrifice social concerns for profit, Rubin and Stankiewicz have recommended that all CDEs be 
required to be mission driven. That was also the recommendation of the Community 
Development Tax Credit Coalition (now renamed the NMTC Coalition) during the drafting of 
the NMTC legislation. At that time, the Coalition was primarily composed of mission-driven 
organizations, but now includes more investor members (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005).
NMTC legislation has not been changed to require all mission-driven CDEs, or even a 
minimum set-asides for them, but the CDFI Fund has attempted to respond to criticisms of bias 
in the scoring system. In the third round, the Fund gave greater weight to both Business Strategy 
and Community Impact than it had previously. The additional points are applied in the second 
phase of the scoring process, though. Each of the four sections (Business Strategy, Community 
Impact, Management Capacity, and Capitalization Strategy) is still worth 25 points in the first  
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phase, so a strong performance in the Capitalization Strategy section is still important to pass the 
first round. The additional weight for Community Impact is five points in the second round 
(Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003, 2005). Also in the third allocation round, the CDFI Fund added 
the question, “How will the economic benefits of the NMTC allocation be apportioned amongst: 
the investors, through economic returns; the Qualified Low-Income Community Investment 
(QLICI) investees/borrowers, through lower costs of capital; and the applicant, through fees or 
economic returns?” (Armistead 2005a, 15-16).
While the nature of an individual CDE’s mission may be an important factor in the types 
of projects it selects, less attention has been given in the literature to the roles of investors and 
developers in project selection. CDEs may set investment priorities consistent with their mission, 
but investors have the ultimate say in whether a project moves ahead. Developers too, may play 
important roles in bringing projects to CDEs’ attention, with their experience in the economics of  
different types of developments. CDEs have a relatively short time to apply their QEIs to 
QLICIs, making it difficult to use NMTCs to finance complex projects in areas that have 
traditionally posed challenges to rapid development, such as inner-city brownfield sites, without 
a strong development team bringing the project to a point where a CDE can make an investment.
CDE service areas
A concern related to the for-profit/mission-driven divide is whether CDEs with local 
service areas invest differently than CDEs with multi-state or national CDEs Local-service CDEs 
make up the largest share of applicants, but represent the smallest share of awardees (CDFI Fund 
2008b). Whether that is good or bad for achieving the most community impact is unclear. Local-
service CDEs may have better knowledge of their community and its most important needs than 
multi-state or national CDEs, but they may also lack the level of capacity of larger CDEs.
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Emphasis on real estate
Overemphasis on real estate projects, as opposed to support for existing non-real estate 
QALICBs, is another frequent complaint about the NMTC program in practice (Armistead 
2005a; Jones 2004; Kellogg 2005; Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003). Although at one time Kellogg, 
while President and CEO of Washington, D.C.’s CF Bank Corporation CDE, told a researcher 
that NMTC is based on the premise that all new investment in targeted urban areas is helpful, 
regardless of its nature (Jones 2004), he has also commented elsewhere that “NMTC capital is 
not yet flowing sufficiently to smaller projects and to non-real estate businesses, especially in the 
form of equity investments (Kellogg 2005, 54).
The CDFI Fund classifies all QALICBs as either real estate or non-real estate, defined as 
follows:
A QALICB that is a real estate business is generally a single purpose entity formed to 
develop or lease a specific real estate transaction. A QALICB that is non-real estate is an 
operating business (e.g. with sales, revenue, customers) whose primary business is not 
real estate development, ownership, or management. If a non-real estate QALICB forms 
a single purpose entity for the purpose of leasing property to that operating business, and 
an allocatee finances the single purpose entity, the CDFI Fund permits the CDE to 
classify the single purpose entity as either a real estate or non-real estate QALICB (CDFI 
Fund 2008b, 19).
Analyzing transaction data through 2008, the GAO found that 65.3 percent of NMTC 
dollars invested had gone to real estate projects, 22.2 percent to business-related projects, and the 
remainder to mixed-purpose and “other” (2010, 12). The GAO also found a substantial 
difference between for-profit and nonprofit CDEs’ choices regarding project types: for-profits 
made 72.3 percent of their investments in real estate projects, while nonprofits made 42.5 percent 
of theirs in real estate. Interestingly, partnerships between for-profit and nonprofit CDEs made 
only 9.9 percent of their NMTC investments in real estate (2010, 13).
The real estate tilt is discouraging to some supporters of the NMTC as a poverty 
alleviation tool because investments backed by real estate are already well collateralized, and it  
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is those operating businesses without that advantage that are in most need of financing 
assistance. There is also concern that real estate investments are less likely to reach 
underrepresented groups of entrepreneurs, like minorities, women, and small locally-based 
business owners (Lambie-Hanson 2008).
The prevalence of real estate investments is also discouraging to those who would like to 
see more QEIs in operating businesses because it is a problem imposed by the structure of the 
program itself. Tax credit recapture provisions can be triggered if a QALICB relocates outside of 
a qualifying census tract and does not serve what the IRS considers to be an appropriate public 
purpose under the “Targeted Population” provisions. “The administrative and definitional 
complexities of determining whether this test is satisfied are quite extreme” (Armistead 2005b,  
119). For even the most community-oriented CDE, real estate is frequently the safer choice for 
its investors, because it is bound to the census tract. One example of this limitation at work was 
LCD New Markets Fund’s inability to invest in a nonprofit transitional housing service for low-
income and mentally ill adults because the organization’s headquarters were not located in an 
LIC census tract (Wells 2005). A recent ruling by the IRS to permit a clinic to open a new 
location directly across the street from a qualifying census tract using NMTC financing, and to 
accept grants, donations, and insurance payments made on behalf of low-income clients to count 
toward the clinic’s requirement to earn at least 50 percent of its gross receipts from services to 
low-income individuals, may have opened a door to investing in more QALICBs as opposed to 
real estate projects, but it is still a higher-risk proposition for CDEs (Reaman and Hoopengardner 
2009). Not everyone regards the real estate tilt as a drawback, however. Lambie-Hanson (2008) 
articulates some of the benefits of real estate investment. They stand to improve existing 
facilities in low-income communities and possibly catalyze improvements by reducing vacancies  
in the neighborhood, cleaning up brownfield sites, and attracting additional investments. Some 
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QEIs in operating businesses are actually for the purpose of real estate improvement or 
acquisition, sometimes assisting businesses in becoming owners of their own locations, reducing 
overhead costs, expanding operations, and/or freeing up other resources for other expenses. 
Lambie-Hanson also found that real estate projects appear to bring more jobs through 
construction and new and expanding businesses to LICs than do investments operating 
businesses, and at less expense in terms of dollars of project cost per job created (2008).
High transaction costs
Another reason that real estate deals tend to be favored over business and nonprofit 
assistance is that they tend to be larger investments. High transaction costs in the early days of 
the program made deals of less than $3-5 million cost prohibitive to most CDEs (Armistead 
2005a). A joke in the NMTC field is that it is “a full-employment program for accountants and 
lawyers” (Armistead 2005b,  26). As of 2005, at least three transactions completed by 
Clearinghouse CDFI had legal fees exceeding $100,000 (Bystry 2005). Just applying for an 
allocation can be a daunting undertaking and expense: LCD New Markets Fund estimated that its 
first application would have taken almost 160 hours and cost $100,000 in staff, consulting, and 
legal fees, had the CDE not had assistance from the City of San Jose and pro bono attorneys. 
Their second application was less costly though, because much of the work did not need to be 
repeated (Wells 2005). 
There is some hope that with experience, and also with more certainty of what the IRS 
will consider compliance, transaction fees will come down. The LIHTC went through a similar 
process at its beginning (Armistead 2005b). There are also other strategies to accomplish the 
sorts of small investments likely to benefit a wider range of community-based businesses and 
nonprofits. Partnerships between larger and smaller CDEs, or between CDEs and non-CDE 
community organizations may make small transactions more manageable. For instance, small  
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CDEs could obtain project-level financing via larger CDEs without the smaller CDE having to 
undergo their own costly learning experiences or hire expensive consultants to underwrite 
individual transactions, while the larger CDE may benefit from the smaller organization’s 
knowledge of local needs and assets (Armistead 2005b). Kellogg felt that as of 2005, there were 
still too many NMTC investors trying to underwrite transactions one by one, instead of 
delegating the task to experienced community developers who could presumably structure the 
deals at less expense (2005). ESIC Realty Partners’ CDE has partnered with Enterprise 
Foundation to make loans as low as $300,000, the Community Reinvestment Fund was working 
in 2005 to develop a secondary smaller loans, and LISC was also working on a program to issues 
smaller loans (Armistead 2005a). New data through 2008 may show whether smaller 
investments are indeed becoming more feasible, or whether the bias in favor of seven-figure or 
higher deals still exists.
Loans vs. equity
Yet another challenge the structure of the NMTC program has posed to investing in 
community business is that loans are more prevalent than equity investment, due again to fear of 
recapture. The difficulty of obtaining equity investment in low-income community businesses 
was one of the primary concerns that led to the creation of the NMTC program, but it frustrates 
its own purpose with the requirement of maintaining a QEI for at least seven years. Equity 
investors who are accustomed to redeeming their investments in less than seven years must, if 
they choose to redeem a QEI, reinvest it within a year to avoid tax credit recapture (Armistead 
2005b). This requirement makes NMTCs unworkable for community development venture 
capital firms (Armistead 2005b). Promising QLICIs can be difficult to identify in only one year, 
particularly for mission-driven CDES that hope to find opportunities to benefit the community as 
well as perform adequately financially (Bystry 2005; Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003). Through 
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2008, 85.1 percent of NMTC dollars invested in QALICBs were term loans (U.S. General 
Accountability Office 2010, 14).
“But for” test
A final issue frequently raised regarding the effectiveness of NMTCs is one that virtually 
every economic development incentive program faces: there is no adequate “but for” test to 
determine whether investments would have occurred anyway without the tax credit (Armistead 
2005b). Interviews with 26 participants in the NMTC program and surveys of numerous others 
who have worked with NMTCs in some way—lawyers, accountants, lenders, investors, 
bureaucrats, and various sorts of consultants—returned overwhelming responses that NMTCs 
were almost always being directed at projects that could not have been done without them, and 
some CDE interviewees said they would not even consider projects they thought could be 
financed without NMTCs (Armistead 2005a). However sincerely felt though, a vested interest in 
seeing the program continue to be reauthorized may color the responses of people who work 
with NMTCs. The aggressive competition for allocations may indeed lead CDEs to promise 
projects in more distressed areas, and lending on more favorable than market terms, but Lance 
and Kanji point out that “NMTCs not only promise to incentivise non-residential real estate 
development in secondary markets and in primary markets in need of stimulus, but also may be a 
useful means to improve the financial returns from development projects already sufficiently 
justified economically in the same markets” (2003, 32).
The possibility of “double dipping,” or combining multiple subsidies and incentives with 
NMTCs is treated somewhat ambiguously in the literature. It is not unusual for community-
driven projects to combine support from various local, state, and federal programs to make them 
financially feasible (Taylor 2005). The only incentive program the NMTC cannot be combined 
with by law is the LIHTC (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2003). The use of historic tax credits along 
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with NMTCs is relatively common; the National Trust launched its own CDE, one of the first to 
receive a signed allocation agreement, and one of the first to report a project underway (Jones 
2004). The Trust estimates that 38 percent of all National Register Historic Districts and 58 
percent of the buildings in those districts are located in census tracts with poverty levels of at 
least 20 percent (Rapoza 2003). Occasionally, however, combining subsidies amounts to 
“sweetening” a deal that would have been feasible with only one of the subsidies or none. Rubin 
and Stankiewicz raise objections to an egregious example: Advantage Capital received one of the 
first round NMTC allocations, with a service area of seven states. In four of those states, 
Advantage is also a “certified capital company” with agreements with the state government to  
receive 100 percent subsidies for making equity and debt investments, investments that could 
also be eligible for NMTC (2003). 
Estimating the total economic costs and benefits of NMTC projects, the opportunity costs 
of shifted capital or the spillover effects in the surrounding community, for instance, poses 
similarly difficult questions as the “but for” test, but is just as important in evaluating the overall  
effectiveness of the program, especially if its intentions are truly poverty alleviation and 
community benefit (Gurley-Calvez et al. 2009; Marples 2008).
NMTCs and disaster recovery
The GO Zone allocation 
With the passage of the Gulf Opportunity Zone act in 2005 and its inclusion of a $1 
billion allocation of NMTCs to be spread over three years, the tax credit took on another 
category of “distress:” disaster-stricken areas, specifically “that portion of the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster area determined by the President to warrant individual or individual and public 
assistance from the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
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Emergency Act by reason of Hurricane Katrina” (Federal Register 2006, 12424). While similar 
in many respects to the regular NMTC program, the GO Zone NMTC allocations introduced 
some different requirements, making some census tracts and populations eligible that would not 
have been under normal circumstances, and also limiting GO Zone NMTCs’ use to the GO Zone 
itself and to CDEs that could demonstrate a “significant mission of recovery and redevelopment 
of the GO Zone,” and could also demonstrate having significant resources already in the GO 
Zone area and a track record of providing services in the region (Federal Register 2006, 12423). 
CDEs with GO Zone allocations could serve the new Targeted Population category specific to 
the GO Zone (the GZTP), which, as discussed previously, permits somewhat higher-income 
census tracts to be served than would normally be the case, but also requires that the population 
being served “must consist of individuals who lack access to loans or equity investments because 
they were displaced from their principal residence or lost their principal source of employment 
because of Hurricane Katrina” (GAO 2010, 11), and that QALICBs be located in census tracts 
that were designated by FEMA as having been flooded or sustained extensive damage as a result 
of the hurricane (CDFI Fund 2008a; GAO 2010). CDEs with allocations from non-GO Zone 
rounds could, of course, still make NMTC investments within the GO Zone if they were in the 
service area designated by their allocation agreements, but could only invest in QALICBs that 
would have already qualified under normal circumstances.
In New Orleans, pre-existing poverty and economic distress meant that most GO Zone-
eligible census tracts were already NMTC-eligible: of 137 census tracts containing parcels of 
land flooded or severely damaged by Katrina according to FEMA, rendering them potentially 
qualified for GZTP NMTC investments, 34 (or approximately 25 percent) were only eligible for 
GZTP investments, the rest were existing LICs already eligible for NMTC investments. Media 
coverage of Katrina and the flooding that followed in New Orleans brought the city’s existing 
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poverty to international attention. Ironically, the day that New Orleans’ levees breached and 
began to flood the city, the Census Bureau issued a report ranking Orleans Parish’s poverty rate 
of 23.2 percent as the seventh highest of 290 large U.S. counties, and thirty-eight percent of New 
Orleans’ poor lived in 47 neighborhoods where poverty was greater than 40 percent (Katz 2006).
New Orleans’ recovery planning
The effects of Hurricane Katrina not only exacerbated existing poverty, it put the entire 
city in greater distress. With 80 percent of the city flooded, approximately three out of every four 
habitable housing units damaged or destroyed (and nearly all of the city’s affordable housing 
inventory), basic infrastructure of all kinds crippled, and vital city services ground to a halt for 
days or weeks, no part of the city was unaffected (Unified New Orleans Plan 2007). It was clear 
that no single source of recovery aid—public, private, or philanthropic—would suffice alone, 
and it was also clear that a recovery plan or plans would be critical in order to prioritize where 
funds should be directed, and to access public recovery funds managed by the Louisiana 
Recovery Authority, which required a parishwide plan for release of funds (Horne and Nee 
2006).
Planning was also viewed as critical to attract much-needed private investment, even if it  
could not be directed by public authorities. “Katrina imposed a significant competitive 
disadvantage to New Orleans” sounds like a gross understatement, appearing in the Economic 
Redevelopment Plan issued by Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB) in 
2006, one of the first recovery plans to be put forth. But to retain existing business and attract 
new investment, New Orleans had to contend with high costs of doing business in the short term, 
and gave uncertainties about the city’s future potential longer term. The continued existence of  
the city itself was in some question, with the possibility of another hurricane or even less 
dramatic storm or flooding event occurring before the levees and drainage systems could be 
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repaired, let alone improved. Many existing businesses had been left unattended for days or 
months even if they had escaped flooding and storm damage, workers were scattered with scarce 
affordable housing options to return to, and public utilities and services were strained or 
unavailable altogether in some parts of the city. Furthermore, how much of New Orleans’ 
population would return in the years to come and how they would be distributed were very much 
in question, leaving the future market and workforce business investors could expect deeply 
uncertain.
The question of how much of New Orleans’ population should return and where they 
should live was also hotly debated throughout all the recovery planning processes. The BNOB 
Commission’s planning process came to a premature end, before it could launch its 
neighborhood-by-neighborhood planning meetings, after an Urban Land Institute report 
commissioned by the BNOB recommended shrinking the city’s footprint and converting some 
neighborhoods perceived to be especially flood-prone to greenspace (Horne and Nee 2006). A 
BNOB panel also suggested that a building permit moratorium be put in place while residents 
proved their neighborhood’s “viability,” which proved so unpopular than Mayor Nagin rejected 
the recommendation (Krupa 2006a), famously declaring that no neighborhood would be off-
limits for rebuilding, and that the market would decide viability in the end (Russell 2006). 
Supporters of consolidating redevelopment cited the high cost of providing services to far-flung 
and sparsely repopulated areas, and fears of a “jack-o-lantern” effect of one or two houses 
reoccupied amidst blocks of blight. Opponents were concerned about the disproportionate effect 
the policy could have on African-Americans, who were more likely than whites to have lived in 
badly flooded areas, that the temporary displacement of evacuation would become permanent for 
many who would like to return to New Orleans, that the unique fabric of individual 
neighborhoods would be lost, and that declaring some neighborhoods unsustainable would create 
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a self-fulfilling prophecy. Horne and Nee (2006) characterized the debate as “‘Jack’ vs. the 
‘Donalds,’” with “Jack” representing the threat of the jack-o-lantern effect, and the “Donalds” as 
Trump and Disney. Both “Donalds” exemplified fears that recovery would focus excessively on 
the downtown area and adjacent French Quarter and Garden District, both popular tourist 
destinations, with developers producing a new New Orleans that would be more affluent on the 
one hand, with lower-income residents unable to afford to return, and more “Disneyfied” on the 
other, serving up a caricature of historic New Orleans culture and architecture without the people 
and neighborhoods that have kept that culture alive and vibrant.
After public outcry halted the BNOB’s neighborhood planning process, New Orleans’ 
City Council launched its own “New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization Plans” (better known 
as the “Lambert Plans,” after one of the planners), exclusive to flooded neighborhoods. The 
distrust generated by the earlier planning efforts is evident in the Lambert Plans’ Summary 
document:
… what came up repeatedly in many lower income communities was a palpable fear that 
the word “improvement” was a euphemism for “displacement” or “gentrification.” Some 
of this fear is the result of earlier post-Katrina redevelopment proposals that wanted to 
examine the wholesale redevelopment of neighborhoods in the city from the ground up. A 
good portion of the rest of the concern came from past experiences (Neighborhoods 
Rebuilding Plan 2006, 4).
Yet another planning process, the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), followed the 
Lambert Plans, as the Louisiana Recovery Authority required a citywide plan before releasing 
recovery funds (Horne and Nee 2006). The UNOP process ultimately produced plans for each of 
the city’s thirteen planning district, as well as a citywide plan. Elements from both the BNOB 
and Lambert Plans were taken into consideration in the course of UNOP, and tension between 
competing recovery strategies persisted. The proportion of resources that should be directed 
toward bolstering areas of relative strength, where more people had already returned, and toward 
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the most devastated areas with the fewest resources to help themselves begin recovery on their 
own continued to be debated (Krupa 2006b, 2007).
The results of UNOP played a part in the selection of 17 targeted recovery zones 
throughout the city, reflecting the interest in deploying limited recovery resources in tightly  
clustered areas on the one hand, but distributing those clusters through different parts of the city 
with different needs on the other. There are three categories of zones:
• Re-Build: areas that have experienced severe destruction, and will require major 
rebuilding;
• Re-Develop: areas where there is already some recovery activity, and have a high 
potential to catalyze further redevelopment in the surrounding community; and
• Re-New: smaller, more specific projects that require only modest public intervention to 
bolster efforts already underway (City of New Orleans).
 There are only two Re-Build zones, but then-recovery czar Ed Blakely slated $145 
million in direct public investment for those two, compared to $161 for all fifteen Re-Develop 
and Re-New zones combined (there are six Re-Develop areas and nine Re-New zones) (Krupa 
and Russell 2007). Public spending on restoration of infrastructure and services throughout the 
city would continue at the same time, and no neighborhoods were to be officially declared off-
limits for rebuilding, but “trigger” projects would be specially cultivated in the targeted zones,  
using programs like other GO Zone tax incentives besides the NMTC to encourage recovery in 
the zones, and possibly catalyze growth outside their borders (Guillet 2007). The zones were 
chosen because of their perceived potential to “[build] around public assets in business corridors 
in an effort to generate further private investment from developers” (City of New Orleans).
How well the city’s targeted zones will fare over time, and whether they will produce 
better results at catalyzing private investment than other comparable business corridors that have 
not been singled out for special attention, remains to be seen. Although New Markets Tax Credits 
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provide a relatively shallow incentive, unable to meet the deepest needs of some of the most 
devastated neighborhoods, they are well-suited to build on other recovery efforts, inside or 
outside of specially targeted zones. One feature that makes them particularly interesting in the 
context of recovery planning—whether recovery from a specific disaster, or planning 
neighborhood recovery from the distress brought on by social and economic changes over time
—is that unlike many forms of community development assistance, like Community 
Development Block Grants or LIHTCs, they are not channeled through state or local 
government. Public agencies attempting to implement their own disaster recovery or community 
development plans may, of course, actively seek out CDEs and their assistance, or partner with 
them on particular projects by helping leverage NMTCs with grants or other incentives at the 
agencies’ disposal. Ultimately, though, it is CDEs’ decision whether investments are socially and 
financially worthwhile, and whether the priorities of public planners have merit. 
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NMTC investments in New Orleans
Several questions have been identified in the literature regarding how effective NMTC 
investments are likely to be at achieving the goal of the program as articulated by its original  
designers and supporters, to bring capital into “places left behind” and “pockets of poverty” to 
alleviate the social and economic distress found there. How NMTC investments made in New 
Orleans reflect the questions, concerns, and predictions made in the literature can begin to be 
determined from data accrued by the CDFI Fund over the last several years, if not be definitively 
answered on all counts.
New Orleans presents an interesting case study of NMTC projects at work in distressed 
communities for two related reasons. First, Louisiana has received the third-highest amount of 
NMTC dollars by state through fiscal year 2008, nearly $863 million. Louisiana was also the 
third-highest state on a per capita basis (U.S. General Accounting Office 2010,  9-10). By my 
analysis of data provided by the CDFI Fund on NMTC transactions reported in Orleans Parish 
(which is contiguous with the city of New Orleans) through 2008, $596 million has been 
invested in New Orleans in 41 distinct projects, 40 of which were in QALICBs (one was an 
investment in another CDE). New Orleans presents a relatively large number of projects and 
quantity of investments to examine. Louisiana’s large share of NMTC dollars is due in large part 
to the second reason New Orleans presents an interesting case study: the special allocations of 
NMTC authority for use in the GO Zone for disaster recovery. Although recovering from disaster 
may set New Orleans’ needs apart from other communities in some ways, in many respects the 
storm’s and flood’s devastation exacerbated existing distress and created new hardships, further 
limiting prospects for profitable private investment in an entire region whose future was left  
uncertain.
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Research questions and methodology
My first question is what NMTC investments have occurred in New Orleans, and how are 
they distributed throughout the city in terms of numbers of projects, types, and amounts of 
investment? In which neighborhoods are they occurring, how severely flooded were those areas, 
and what are their poverty and median income levels, according to the 2000 U.S. Census? Using 
transaction data provided by the CDFI Fund, I have mapped the projects and located them within 
New Orleans’ neighborhoods as defined by the City Planning Commission. I also used a 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) map to estimate flood levels at 
project sites, and the City of New Orleans’ online GIS Property Viewer to find whether projects 
were located in or near the city’s 17 targeted recovery zones.
To review types of NMTC projects occurring in New Orleans, I have used both the 
classification of Real Estate (RE) or Non-Real Estate (NRE) QALICB as defined by the CDFI 
Fund, and the qualitative project descriptions reported by CDEs to the CDFI Fund. Although the 
CDFI Fund is not permitted to publish names, addresses, or other specific identifying 
information about recipients of NMTC investments, some CDEs and their clients choose to make 
their projects public. Where that has been the case, I have also used newspaper articles, press 
releases, and other published project information to determine the nature of the project’s  
purposes.
While looking at the types of NMTC-funded projects and their distribution through the 
city can begin to provide a description of how they are shaping recovery and community 
development, there are some serious challenges to interpreting much of the NMTC data on New 
Orleans investments, especially where it concerns examining questions raised in the literature on 
the nature of different CDEs  (e.g. for-profit or mission-driven, the extent of their service areas, 
or whether they are locally based). The first challenge is the extent to which Hurricane Katrina 
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and its aftermath altered the city’s demographics. Using 11-year old Census data on poverty and 
median income is even more flawed in New Orleans than it is in most other cities. Even if 
poverty and income have stayed roughly similar between 1999 and now in some area, the degree 
of disaster-related distress may skew some results. For instance, even if a neighborhood like 
Fillmore (where one large NMTC project occurred) has retained the higher than average median 
income and low poverty rates it had at the last census, percentages of poverty do not indicate 
whether or not those affluent individuals are the only residents to return to their block, 
surrounded by vacancies and blight. It would be worthwhile to revisit these projects when 
accurate post-Katrina demographic information is available at the census tract level.
Another caveat to interpreting the data on different CDE types is that, while New Orleans 
has received a relatively large share of NMTC investments through 2008—more, in dollar 
amounts, than some states received altogether in the same period, the number of CDEs and 
projects is small enough that when they are subdivided into different types, the cases are too few 
to test for statistical significance or distinguish possible outliers that may skew the data.
Interpreting project impacts in a community is also particularly challenging. The CDFI 
Fund’s Transaction Level Reports do include many fields that could be useful to gauge various 
sorts of community impact, like projected jobs to be created, sizes of facilities, capacity of  
community facilities, and projected numbers of people served. Unfortunately, there are two 
obstacles to using that data. Many CDEs do not report on some or all of those fields (which are 
voluntary), and among those that do, some projects receive investments from more than one 
CDE, making the possibility of double-counting outcomes a risk. Around 18 percent of projects 
in the CIIS database as of 2008 were funded by more than one CDE (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2010). The GAO, in a recent report on NMTC projects nationwide, found 
that the limitations on the available data, along with the diverse range of projects with varying 
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purposes, made isolating project impacts difficult (U.S. Government Accountability Office 
2010). For instance, one of the projects the GAO selected for its individual case studies was an 
after-school program facility. Viewed from a standpoint of job creation, the 12 full-time jobs 
associated with the project appear to be contributing little to the low-income community, but  
from the standpoint of the counseling, physical education, and other benefits to at-risk children 
not found in their local public schools, the impact is much greater (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2010). 
Despite the impediments to drawing conclusions about CDE behavior based on New 
Orleans data, describing the projects and transactions that took place through 2008 may be useful 
for identifying more questions worth asking either about transactions over a large enough region 
to provide enough data, or in New Orleans in the future, when more transactions have taken 
place and been reported. For this thesis, I compared CDEs based on the amounts of investments 
they made in flooded areas, census tracts with 2000 poverty levels greater than 30 percent, 
census tracts with 2000 median incomes below 60 percent of AMI (greater than 30 percent 
poverty and lower than 60 percent AMI are fields the CDFI Fund tracks to show investments 
occurring in areas of greater distress than required by the program, and also compared the 
ranges, averages, and medians of their transactions.
One of the significant questions in the literature is whether the nature of a CDE’s parent 
organization, i.e. whether it is mission-driven (nonprofit or a CDFI), for-profit, or public, 
influences the nature of its investment choices, particularly the relative emphases it places on 
profit and community impact. The limitations of the New Orleans data were immediately 
apparent, as only one of the 18 CDEs was a nonprofit (there were no CDFIs or publicly created 
CDEs active in New Orleans through the period reported on).
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Two more questions about the nature of CDEs are whether the location of their 
headquarters influences their investment decisions (New Orleans- or Louisiana-based, or out of 
state), and whether the extent of their service area influences their decisions. On the one hand, a 
small service area may contribute to a more intimate knowledge of that area’s needs, while on 
the other hand, a CDE capable of serving nationwide may have greater capacity to handle many 
kinds of transactions efficiently. To examine the first question, I compared CDEs based in New 
Orleans, all CDEs based in Louisiana, and CDEs from outside the state. To examine the second, I 
divided CDEs into those with local-to-statewide service areas, those with multi-state service 
areas, and those with national service areas. For both questions, I compared the same measures 
as I did with mission-driven and for-profit CDEs. In addition to those measures, I compared the 
proportion and number of their investments in non-real estate QALICBs. Also, because of 
concerns of an overly broad definition of low-income community and the particular possibility 
that central business districts may qualify as LICs and receive a disproportionate share of 
investments relative to their amount of local community distress, I compared the number and 
proportion of their investments in New Orleans’ Central Business District.
New Orleans projects overview
I identified 121 individual transactions that took place in New Orleans reported between 
fiscal years 2004 (the earliest year reported) and 2008. Those transactions were made in 41 
distinct projects. 40 of those projects were investments in QALICBs, another was an investment 
in another CDE (117 transactions were made in QALICBs; there were four individual 
investments in the same CDE). The total dollars invested in QALICBs was $577,638,771, with 
another $18,115,528 invested in a CDE for hospital-related purposes.
Individual transactions in QALICBs ranged from $25,000 to $47,582,400, with an 
average investment size of  $4,937,083, and a median of $2,775,000. Total amounts invested in 
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individual QALICB projects ranged from $25,000 to $77,321,400, with an average project 
amount of $14,811,250, and a median of $6,650,000.
Limited transaction data through 2007, but not yet through 2008, is available from the 
CDFI Fund’s website. Nationwide, the 2,495 NMTC transactions reported through 2007 ranged 
from $1,950 to $99,500,000, with an average transaction size of $3,590,752, and a median of 
$1,611,200.
Not surprisingly, transactions began slowly, with only 2 in 2004, the first year reported. 
The number of transactions and amount invested rose sharply in 2007 (Illustration 1, Table 1). 
Nationwide, transactions began in 2003, and rose steadily through 2007 (the most recent year 
available from publicly released data) (Illustration 2, Table 2). New Orleans’ sharp rise in 2007 is 
no doubt related to the response to Hurricane Katrina, and probably funds from the first round of 
GO Zone allocations beginning to come to fruition.
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Illustration 1: New Orleans transactions by year
Fiscal year Transactions Dollars
2004 2 $16,400,000 
2005 4 $14,200,000 
2006 7 $94,145,000 
2007 40 $187,745,950 
2008 64 $265,147,821 
Table 1: New Orleans transactions by year
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Fiscal year Transactions Dollars
2003 17 $88,997,064 
2004 232 $749,880,698 
2005 526 $1,844,709,256 
2006 764 $2,932,397,189 
2007 956 $3,342,943,067 
Table 2: National transactions by year
Real estate or non-real estate
Only 22.5 percent (nine out of 40) of the QALICB projects were classified as “real 
estate,” 70 percent (28 out of 40) were classified as “non-real estate” (or operating businesses 
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Illustration 2: National transactions by year
whose primary purpose is not real estate ownership, development, or management), and 7.5 
percent (three out of 40) projects received a combination of real estate and non-real estate 
investments. In terms of dollars invested however, real estate projects made up 36 percent of the 
total ($207,113,604), non-real estate 44 percent ($255,470,167), and the 3 combination projects 
received 20 percent of total investments ($115,055,000) (Illustration 3). Of the $115,055,000 
invested in combination projects, 51 percent ($59,105,000) came from real estate transactions, 
and 49 percent ($55,950,000) from non-real estate transactions, making the total amount invested 
in real estate transactions in New Orleans to $266,218,604 or 46 percent, and the total amount 
invested in non-real estate QALICBs to $311,420,167, or 54 percent.
A 2008 analysis of nationwide transaction data through 2006 by the CDFI Fund found 
that at that time, 49 percent of all QALICB transactions and 32 percent of dollars invested were 
in non-real estate businesses, and 51 percent of QALICB transactions making up 68 percent of 
dollars invested were in real estate businesses. It is worth noting that a non-real estate QALICB 
may use an NMTC investment for real estate-related purposes, and also that if a non-real estate 
QALICB forms a single purpose entity for the purpose of leasing property to that QALICB, the 
CDFI Fund allows the CDE making the investment to choose whether to classify it as a real 
estate or non-real estate investment (CDFI Fund 2008b).
50
Locations and business descriptions
Armistead (2005a) raises the concern that “LIC” was defined too broadly, and could lead 
projects occurring in census tracts that technically qualify, but are not truly among the neediest  
communities. Rubin and Stankiewicz (2003) echo that concern, and note that central business 
districts often qualify because their sparse residential populations may be impoverished, even if 
the district itself is hardly a low-income “community” and projects undertaken there are not 
necessarily for the residential community’s benefit. In New Orleans, QALICB projects have 
occurred in 15 of the city’s 72 neighborhoods as defined by the City Planning Commission 
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Illustration 3: Real estate and non-real estate QALICBs
(Illustrations 4 and 5, Table 3), but 10 of those projects fell within the Central Business District 
(CBD), representing 51 percent of all NMTC dollars invested in New Orleans QALICBs7. 
7 Four QALICB projects reported different locations between the first year an investment was made in them and 
later years, in each case it was plausible that it was the same project, but the business had moved. In those cases,  
I have used the most recent address as the project’s primary location.
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Illustration 4: Map of New Orleans neighborhoods with NMTC investments
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Illustration 5: NMTC projects by neighborhood
Neighborhood Number 
of 
projects
Percent 
of 
projects
Dollars 
invested
Percent 
of $ 
invested
2000 
Poverty8
2000 
Average 
Household 
Income9 
Behrman 1 2.56% $25,000 0.00% 33.4% $30,409
Fairgrounds 1 2.56% $122,800 0.02% 16.9% $39,012
Marigny 1 2.56% $3,700,000 0.64% 24.1% $35,764
Desire Area 1 2.56% $4,650,000 0.81% 35.7% $27,077
Mid-City 3 7.69% $13,728,500 2.38% 32.1% $31,442
Gert Town 3 7.69% $14,356,987 2.49% 48.6% $22,685
Viavant 2 5.13% $15,000,000 2.60% 47.9% $20,595
Leonidas 3 7.69% $17,434,000 3.02% 31.5% $32,016
Audubon 1 2.56% $20,000,000 3.46% 17.9% $108,964
Freret 1 2.56% $25,000,000 4.33% 33.5% $40,686
Lower Garden 
District
3 7.69% $36,021,000 6.24% 28.5% $56,981
Fillmore 1 2.56% $60,709,000 10.51% 11.6% $57,893
Central City 8 20.51% $70,510,023 12.21% 49.8% $23,237
Central Business 
District
10 25.64% $296,381,461 51.31% 32.3% $67,633
Table 3: Investments in New Orleans neighborhoods: percentages of projects and dollars  
invested
Promisingly for community impact both in the CBD and for the entire metro region, the 
largest investment in the CBD is a health care training facility. Louisiana’s health statistics were  
some of the poorest in the nation before Hurricane Katrina, and the disaster had a severe impact 
on the region’s health care system, particularly for low-income individuals. Five years after 
Katrina, the VA hospital and the primary public hospital have yet to reopen. Cultivation of a 
downtown medical and biotechnical district for economic development purposes has also been a 
high priority for the city. Less promisingly for community benefit, four of the ten CBD projects 
are hotels—making up ten percent of all QALICB projects in New Orleans, and 22 percent of 
8 Neighborhood-level poverty rates and average income from the 2000 Census, calculated by the Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center: www.gnocdc.org
9 The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center was unable to calculate median income at the neighborhood 
level, so average neighborhood income is given instead. Average income in 2000 for Orleans Parish was 
$43,176; average income for Louisiana was $44,833; and for the United States was $56,644.
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NMTC dollars invested in the city. While New Orleans’ tourism industry was set back 
considerably in the aftermath of Katrina and arguably in need of support, hotels are among the 
business types Groves (2007) has dubbed “Problematic Purposed Projects,” with too little to 
offer LIC residents to justify tax credit-subsidized financing. The CBD is also home to one of 
New Orleans’ highest-profile NMTC-supported projects, the expansion of the National World 
War II Museum (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2007), as well as to a clothing retailer, an 
architectural and construction management company, a technology company, and a mixed-use 
real estate project intended to include a nursing facility.
Nearby Central City follows the Central Business District, with eight projects making up 
12 percent of NMTC dollars invested in New Orleans. Not all of the eight Central City projects 
have substantial descriptions, but they include a hospital, a Home Depot (Quillen 2009), day care 
services, and film production services. The last is another promising project for local economic 
development goals, as Louisiana has been cultivating itself as “Hollywood South” since 
introducing film tax credits in 2002, but has had some difficulty attracting post-production film 
business because of the scarcity of sound stages and editing facilities (Moran 2009). One of the 
hopes for the film industry in Louisiana is that it will produce more well-paying jobs with 
opportunities for advancement with increasing skills.
The flood-ravaged Fillmore neighborhood, better known in New Orleans as part of the 
Gentilly district, was the third-highest recipient of NMTC investments in dollars thanks to a 
single project, the private boy’s school, Holy Cross (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
2008). Holy Cross left its damaged campus in the Lower Ninth Ward after Katrina, and its choice 
of the Gentilly site over one in New Orleans’ unflooded suburb, Kenner, was heralded as a major 
vote of confidence in the Gentilly area’s recovery (Carr 2009). Holy Cross is the only project that 
would not have occurred without the GO Zone allocation and its admission of census tracts and 
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targeted populations affected by disaster: its census tract had an eight percent poverty level, 2 
percent unemployment level, and 159 percent of area median income according to 1999 U.S. 
Census data. It is located, however, in the most deeply flooded area of all the NMTC projects in 
this dataset. According to the NOAA’s September 3, 2005 New Orleans flood level map, the 
Fillmore site that would become to Holy Cross was under approximately 7-8 feet of water at that 
time.
The Lower Garden District, adjacent to both the Central Business District and Central 
City, had the fourth-highest amount of NMTC dollars invested, in three projects altogether. Two 
of the three would probably qualify as “problematic” for Groves: a restaurant, and the New 
Orleans Convention Center’s Marriott Hotel (DuBos2009), although the Convention Center and 
its surroundings were damaged both materially and in image after serving as a refuge of last 
resort for New Orleanians trapped in the city after Katrina. The third Lower Garden District 
project is Second Line Stages, a film studio that was awarded the Council of Development 
Finance Agencies’ award for the nation’s best tax credit financed project in 2009. Features of the 
project that stood out to the Council include its renovation of a historic warehouse, LEED Silver 
Certification, and cooperation with area community organizations to create educational programs 
for at-risk youth (Council of Development Finance Agencies 2009).
The Freret neighborhood had a single, relatively large NMTC-supported project: the 
Ochsner/Baptist medical center, which is credited with restoring over 1,350 jobs—a substantial 
impact (DuBos 2009), as well as restoring health care facilities that had been badly flooded. The 
area was under approximately 5-6 feet of water on September 3, 2005.
A Tulane University student center (LaRose 2007) was the sole recipient of NMTC funds 
in the Audubon neighborhood. Its census tract exemplifies the difficulty in defining a “low-
income community”: with a 40 percent poverty rate in 1999, the tract qualified for NMTC 
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investments even without taking hurricane-related damage into account, but it also had a median 
income of 339 percent of AMI. The tract contains both Tulane and Loyola Universities, as well 
as a wealthy, private, gated street, Audubon Place, presenting a marked contrast between income 
levels. The use of NMTC funds for a private university’s students also raises the question of how 
well the low-income community of the Audubon area, as opposed to the student community, is 
served by the project.
The NMTC project investment sizes get smaller in the remaining neighborhoods, which 
is not necessarily a bad sign, as it suggests that CDEs are finding ways to reduce transaction 
costs enough to make small investments feasible. With three percent of NMTC investment 
dollars, the Leonidas neighborhood received a grocery store and drug store in its flooded portion, 
and a travel service business on its “dry” side. Viavant was the only neighborhood in the New 
Orleans East district to receive NMTC dollars as of 2008, with two industrial projects. Gert 
Town was one of two neighborhoods to have NMTC investments in housing; NMTC funds were 
also invested in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation center, a recording studio, and a retail center.  
Mid-City’s projects include a non-profit retailer, multi-family housing, and a restaurant.
Finally, four neighborhoods received less than one percent apiece of NMTC dollars 
invested in New Orleans. Projects in those neighborhoods include a performing arts company, a 
day care, a warehouse, and another film studio.
Target recovery zones
The City of New Orleans’ online GIS Property Viewer includes an overlay showing the 
boundaries of each targeted recovery zone. I found only eight projects out of the 40 located 
within or immediately adjacent to either a Re-New or a Re-Develop zone, making up 20 percent 
of all projects, and 24 percent of dollars invested. As of 2008, NMTC investments do not appear 
to be closely following city-designated recovery priorities.
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Re-New zones are defined by the city’s current recovery plan as specific projects 
requiring only modest intervention to support work already underway by the private or nonprofit 
sector. Two projects apiece were located in or across the street from two of the nine Re-New 
zones: “Canal Street (Downtown)” and “Tulane Avenue at Jeff Davis (Comiskey Park)” (in the 
Mid-City area). Those four projects make up $103 million in NMTC investments, or 18 percent 
of the total dollars invested in New Orleans. 
Each of the city’s six Re-Develop zones is around one half mile in diameter, and requires 
somewhat more intervention than a Re-New zone. They had some recovery resources already 
present when they were designated, and are considered to have high potential for attracting 
additional investment in their surrounding communities. There were also two projects apiece in 
or adjacent to two Re-Develop zones: “Carrollton Avenue at I-10” and “South Claiborne Avenue 
at Toledano,” comprising approximately $32 million in NMTC investments, or six percent of the 
total.
There were no NMTC projects in or around either of the city’s two Re-Build zones, one 
half mile in diameter like the Re-Develop zones, but having experienced extensive physical 
destruction and social disruption, and requiring much more investment in order to recover.
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Projects by flood depth, September 3, 2005
Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent levee failures devastated New Orleans in more 
ways than flooding alone; the storm itself damaged structures all over the city, and whether 
physically damaged by wind or flood, businesses all over the city were left out of operation, 
without basic city service, and were frequently unattended for days or weeks. That a 
neighborhood sustained little or no flooding does not mean it was not severely impacted, but 
extensive flooding certainly inflicted considerable physical damage to overcome, shared by 
entire neighborhoods, in addition to all the other setbacks New Orleans communities faced.
To put the extent to which NMTC investments reached Katrina-devastated areas into 
some perspective, I estimated each project location’s approximate flood depth as of September 3,  
2005 using a Google Earth image overlay of the NOAA’s map of estimated flood depths on that 
date, produced by user “terrencemay” (2006; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
2005). These estimates are not intended to represent actual maximum flood depths at each 
project site, nor maximum flood depths for the surrounding area, but are intended to give a 
relative idea of how NMTC investments were distributed with respect to flooding (Illustration 6, 
Table 4). Twenty-six projects out of 40, representing $429 million NMTC dollars invested (65 
percent of all projects and 74 percent of NMTC dollars) were found in areas with approximately 
two or fewer feet of flooding on September 3. This raises questions about the efficacy of NMTCs 
for disaster relief. Although the Holy Cross project alone represented 10 percent of NMTC 
dollars invested and is located in one of the deeply flooded neighborhoods of the city, NMTCs 
have not otherwise done a good job of reaching the most disaster-stricken parts of the city. This 
may be influenced by high flood insurance costs, flood mitigation requirements, or lack of 
investor confidence in the redevelopment potential of flooded areas.
59
9/3/2005 
Flood depth
Number of 
projects
Dollars 
invested
Percent of $ 
invested
0 12 $159,331,023 27.6%
0-1 9 $145,160,061 25.1%
1-2 5 $124,494,200 21.6%
2-3 4 $28,185,000 4.9%
3-4 3 $12,255,987 2.1%
4-5 1 $6,650,000 1.2%
5-6 4 $38,728,500 6.7%
6-7 1 $2,125,000 0.4%
7-8 1 $60,709,000 10.50%
Table 4: Projects and dollars invested by depth of flooding 9/3/2005
Mission-driven and for-profit CDEs
Unfortunately, only one of the 18 CDEs that made NMTC investments in New Orleans 
QALICBs reported through 2008 is categorized by the CDFI Fund as a nonprofit, and none of 
60
Illustration 6: Projects and dollars invested by depth of flooding 9/3/2005
the CDEs are a CDFI, either for- or nonprofit. This makes it especially difficult to make any 
inferences as to the role of mission-driven CDEs in New Orleans, as opposed to the particular 
actions of this one CDE, which may have more to do with its own specific mission, capacity, or 
knowledge of its service area’s needs than with its mission-driven status in general (this CDE is 
not located in New Orleans, but serves a multi-state region that includes Louisiana). 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that six of the ten lowest individual transactions in terms of 
dollars (and all five of the five lowest) were made by the nonprofit CDE. This suggests that it has 
developed strategies for making investments with lower transaction costs, and it may also 
suggest that it places a lower priority on potential profit than on community impact. Its 
transactions range from $25,000 to $3,500,00, with an average transaction of $606,413 and a 
median of $61,400. Seventy-eight percent of its dollars invested were in areas with flood depths 
of 2-3 feet or higher (77 percent of its dollars were invested in areas with flood depths of 5-6 
feet, in just two projects). Seventy-nine percent of its dollars invested were in census tracts with 
poverty levels greater than 30 percent according to the 2000 Census, and 79 percent of its dollars 
invested were in census tracts with median incomes below 60 percent of AMI. None of the 
projects the nonprofit CDE invested in were located in the CBD. The types of projects the CDE 
chose were two day care services, a sound recording studio, a performing arts company, housing, 
a restaurant, and a religious organization (whose specific purpose for using the investment is not 
given).
By contrast, the individual transactions made by for-profit CDEs range from $92,000 to 
$47,582,400, with an average of $5,254,931 and a median of $2,940,000. Twenty-five percent of 
for-profit CDE dollars were invested in areas with flood depths of 2-3 feet or higher. Seventy-
one percent of their dollars were invested in census tracts with 1999 poverty levels greater than 
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30 percent, and only 13 percent were invested in census tracts with median incomes below 60 
percent of AMI (Table 5).
Nonprofit For-profit
Flood Depth > 2 feet 78% 25%
Poverty Level > 30% 79% 71%
Median Income < 60% 79% 13%
Lowest Transaction $25,000 $92,000 
Highest Transaction $3,500,000 $47,582,400 
Average Transaction $606,413 $5,254,931 
Median Transaction $61,400 $2,940,000.00
Table 5: Nonprofit and for-profit CDEs
Locally-based CDEs
Six of the 18 CDEs are based in New Orleans, another CDE is based in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana. The other 11 CDEs are based in other states. One New Orleans-based CDE indicated 
a national service area (apart from GO Zone allocations, which are necessarily restricted to the 
GO Zone region itself), and three indicated multi-state service areas, and therefore could have 
spent their allocations many places. The six New Orleans-based CDEs made 58 out of the 117 
total individual transactions, and invested $292,622,617 out of $577,638,771 total QALICB 
investments (50 percent of transactions, and 51 percent of dollars invested). If all of the 
Louisiana-based CDEs are counted together (the six from New Orleans plus one from Baton 
Rouge), they made 62 transactions totaling $316,372,617 (53 percent of transactions, and 55 
percent of dollars invested).
Differences between New Orleans-based, all of Louisiana-based, and out-of-state CDEs 
were not especially pronounced on the measures of flood depths of 2-3 feet or greater or poverty 
level, but where median income is concerned, CDEs from out of state invested only eight percent 
of their NMTC funds in areas below 60 percent of AMI, compared to 19 percent by New Orleans 
CDEs and 18 percent for Louisiana CDEs altogether. The dollar amounts of non-real estate 
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transactions are another area where out-of-state CDEs diverge from state and local CDEs. The 
quantity of transactions are not that different: New Orleans CDEs made 40 non-real estate 
transactions, all Louisiana CDEs made 41, and out-of-state CDEs made 39, but the proportion of 
each type of CDE’s total dollars invested were 44, 45, and 72 percent respectively. A third area of 
potential difference is in the proportion of dollars invested in the CBD: out-of-state CDEs 
invested 58 percent of their funds in CBD projects, as opposed to 44 percent by New Orleans 
CDEs and 45 percent by all Louisiana CDEs (Table 6). 
The sample of CDEs is too small for the differences to be tested for statistical 
significance. 
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New Orleans 
only
all Louisiana Out-of-state
Number of CDEs 6 7 11
Flood Depth > 2 feet 23% 24% 28%
Poverty Level > 30% 69% 71% 72%
Median Income < 60% 19% 18% 8%
Lowest Transaction $92,000 $92,000 $25,000 
Highest Transaction $47,582,400 $47,582,400 $39,750,000 
Average Transaction $5,045,218 $5,102,784 $4,750,294 
Median Transaction $2,383,000 $2,394,625 $2,940,000 
NRE Transactions $162,765,278 $172,046,528 $187,952,129 
Number of NRE Transactions 40 41 39
Proportion of NRE Transactions ($) 56% 54% 72%
Transactions in CBD $130,056,400 $143,806,400 $152,575,061 
Number of CBD Transactions 18 21 22
Proportion of CBD Transactions ($) 44% 45% 58%
Total Transactions $292,622,617 $316,372,617 $261,266,154 
Number of Transactions 58 62 55
Table 6: Local and non-local CDEs
CDE service areas
CDEs can designate different service areas each time they apply for an allocation, and 
eight of the eighteen CDEs that invested in New Orleans through 2008 designated more than one 
service area over different allocation rounds. In several cases, this was probably because they 
were applying for the special GO Zone allocations, which can only be applied in states with GO 
Zone census tracts. In order to classify the CDEs’ service areas, I used the CDFI Fund’s online 
Searchable Award Database to find the organization profile for each CDE for each year that it  
was awarded an allocation of NMTCs. If a CDE’s service areas were designated “national” for 
all the allocation rounds it received an award in except for those in which it indicated that its  
application was intended for use in the GO Zone, I classified it as a predominantly national 
service area CDE.
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Only one CDE had an exclusively local (New Orleans metro area) service area, and one 
had a single allocation for statewide use in Louisiana. Two CDEs had a mix of service areas over 
different allocation years that included state and/or local levels, with multi-state as the largest  
service area. Three more CDEs were multi-state throughout their allocation years, and 11 had 
national service areas (although some of those also had GO Zone-specific allocations). I 
combined the CDEs with local and statewide service areas into a single “Louisiana” category of 
two CDEs, in order to compare them with multi-state (five CDEs) and national CDEs (11 CDEs).
There is more noticeable (but not necessarily statistically significant) variation between 
service area categories than there is between CDE headquarter locations. Multi-state CDEs made 
the most QALICB transactions, with 58 (50 percent of the total transactions), while national 
CDEs invested the most funds, with $260,212,367 (45 percent of all NMTC dollars invested). 
Multi-state CDEs invested in areas flooded with 2-3 feet of water or more to a greater extent than 
either state or national service area CDEs, with 46 percent of their dollars invested, as opposed to 
15 and 13 percent, respectively. On the other hand, multi-state CDEs invested a much lower 
proportion of their dollars in census tracts with 1999 poverty levels greater than 30 percent, with 
48 percent of their funds going to those areas, as opposed to 97 percent of state CDEs’ funds and 
82 percent of national CDEs’ funds. Multi-state CDEs made a full 95 percent of their 
investments, dollarwise, in non-real estate businesses. State and national CDEs made 17 percent 
and 20 percent of their investments in non-real estate QALICBs, respectively. Multi-state CDEs 
also invested a lower proportion of their NMTC funds in the CBD than did the other categories, 
21 percent, as opposed to 85 percent of state CDEs’ funds and 65 percent of national CDEs’ 
(Table 7).
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Louisiana Multi-state National
Number of CDEs 2 5 11
Flood Depth > 2 feet 15% 46% 13%
Poverty Level > 30% 97% 48% 82%
Median Income < 60% 7% 17% 13%
Lowest Transaction $92,000 $25,000 $150,000 
Highest Transaction $47,582,400 $19,826,000 $39,750,000 
Average Transaction $6,908,695 $3,805,253 $5,782,497 
Median Transaction $1,371,361 $2,275,000 $3,247,454 
NRE Transactions $16,658,333 $210,230,684 $89,531,150 
Number of NRE Transactions 9 51 20
Proportion of NRE Transactions ($) 17% 95% 34%
Transactions in CBD $82,321,400 $46,185,000 $167,875,061 
Number of CBD Transactions 5 13 25
Proportion of CBD Transactions ($) 85% 21% 65%
Total Transactions $96,721,733 $220,704,671 $260,212,367 
Number of Transactions 14 58 45
Table 7: CDEs by service area size
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Research conclusions
Few conclusions can be drawn from the small amount of data New Orleans NMTC 
projects represent, and because demographic data for New Orleans are outdated. It would be 
worthwhile to revisit these projects when accurate post-Katrina demographic information is 
available at the census tract level. Also, the CDFI Fund is continuing to work on improving its 
data collection and manage double-counting dilemmas, which could make more measures of 
community impact available and useful from those CDEs that report on community impact 
measures (U.S. General Accounting Office 2010). Nevertheless, there are some lessons that can 
be learned from New Orleans, NMTC projects.
It is an encouraging sign for CDEs everywhere that transactions as low as $25,000 have 
been made, which demonstrates that strategies are developing to overcome the high transaction 
costs seen in the program’s early years. That six of the ten lowest transactions made in New 
Orleans came from a mission-driven CDE may also support the contention that they are more 
likely to place community impact over profit than their for-profit counterparts, but it may also be 
a matter of that particular CDE’s mission or level of capacity to be able to structure deals at low 
cost. Whether an argument can be made for set-asides for mission-driven organizations, or even 
restriction of the program to nonprofits and CDFIs, would have to be based on a broader review 
of mission-driven CDEs across the country. It is interesting to note that only one mission-driven 
CDE made NMTC investments in New Orleans through this period, even after Katrina, when 
nonprofits and philanthropy were highly active in the area. This particular CDE is located in the 
Gulf South region and serves a multi-state area, so perhaps it was better prepared than other 
mission-driven CDEs elsewhere in the country to understand New Orleans’ needs and also to 
conduct business in New Orleans. The activity of the 17 for-profit CDEs in New Orleans in a 
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wide variety of projects across the city—some “problematic,” but others answering community 
needs like health care and reaching neighborhoods beyond downtown—suggests that even with a 
mixed record of community- and profit-oriented investments, for-profit CDEs’ ability to bring 
capital to communities in need should not be entirely dismissed.
Less encouraging for community development prospects is the tilt towards the CBD, both 
in number of projects and amount invested. Although projects like health care training facilities  
stand to have city- or even region-wide impact in low-income communities despite being located 
in a central business district, the CBD is not a neighborhood where restricted access to capital 
relative to the rest of the city has been a particular problem.
The focus on the CBD and on other areas with little or no flooding is also somewhat 
discouraging for the NMTC as a disaster-recovery tool. In light of the post-Katrina debates over 
where recovery resources should be concentrated—in areas of strength where people and 
businesses began returning early on, or in the most devastated neighborhoods with the least 
ability to help themselves—the investment of 74 percent of New Orleans’ NMTC dollars in 
unflooded or lightly flooded areas appears to follow the pattern of placing resources in areas of 
strength. Similarly, of the four city-designated targeted recovery zones where NMTC projects are 
occurring, none are in the highly distressed Re-Build category, and most of the dollars invested 
have gone to the least distressed Re-New category. That does not necessarily mean that most 
CDEs active in New Orleans espouse the belief that a smaller city with resources directed toward 
already strong areas is the best recovery strategy, however. It may be that, as a shallow incentive 
intended to fill financing gaps for “marginally do-able” deals, much of New Orleans has needed 
far more than marginal assistance. An area for further research would be to see whether NMTC 
investments reported in 2009 and beyond (especially if Congress continues to reauthorize the 
program) reach farther into the city’s more damaged neighborhoods, or maintain a bias toward 
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downtown. In either case, Louisiana’s ranking as the third-highest recipient of NMTC dollars 
reported through 2008 shows that New Markets can and does bring investment to disaster areas, 
even if they are not necessarily evenly distributed or distributed in proportion to the level of 
distress. If NMTCs are used again as part of a disaster relief package, a lesson for public officials 
may be to work closely with CDEs to help identify and finance areas that are weakened but still  
potentially viable with some financing assistance, and steer the other public and private resources 
at their disposal to more devastated areas. Establishing zones targeted for mutually reinforcing 
public and private investment, as New Orleans has done, may be one way to attract NMTC 
investments. Eight out of 40 NMTC QALICB projects occurring in New Orleans’ targeted 
recovery zones as of 2008 is encouraging, but that only four of the 17 zones received 
investments is less so. The zones were only established in 2007, though, so it may be that more 
time is necessary for CDEs to identify worthwhile projects and close deals in the zones—
whether the city’s targeting efforts will be successful in general, and with respect to NMTCs, 
remains to be seen.
While it is difficult to draw many conclusions about different types of CDEs based on 
New Orleans data because of the outdated demographic information and also the possibility that 
some projects may skew some of the outcomes (e.g. the large investments in Holy Cross, which 
make up a disproportionate amount of dollars invested in deeply flooded areas, and also affect 
calculations based on median income and poverty levels), the comparison of CDEs based on 
service areas levels raises some questions worth further testing with datasets large enough to 
determine whether the differences suggested by New Orleans’ experience are statistically 
significant. In particular, multi-state CDEs have far higher investments in operating businesses 
than real estate businesses compared to state/local CDEs and national CDEs, a noticeably lower 
proportion of their dollars invested in the CBD, and a higher proportion of dollars invested in 
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areas with 2-3 feet or more of flooding. Is it possible that multi-state CDEs combine the 
advantages of knowledge of community needs expected in state/local CDEs with the high 
capacity of national CDEs? 
On the whole, I find the NMTC program to have been an advantage for New Orleans, 
even if at present it shows shortcomings in permitting investments in “problematic” projects that  
do not show much promise of benefitting low-income or disaster-displaced populations, and 
downtown businesses not at special geographic disadvantage for obtaining conventional 
financing. Especially encouraging is the almost $155 million invested in hospital and health care-
related QALICBs, 27 percent of NMTC dollars invested in New Orleans QALICBs (before 
considering the additional $18 million invested in a health care-focused CDE). Better access to 
health care of all kinds is a critical need for the entire region, and is also a specific economic 
development goal for the city that stands to create jobs with good pay, benefits, and opportunities 
for advancement. The state has created a special economic development district in New Orleans 
for that specific purpose. Also encouraging is the attention to some of the city’s designated 
targeted recovery zones, and almost $21 million invested in film production facilities, filling a  
need to support one of the state’s economic goals, and one that ideally will create more jobs with 
opportunities to learn new skills and advance careers. 
While larger data sets that permit testing quantitative data for statistical significance  
would be valuable for future research, another important area for further attention is qualitative 
case studies of CDEs and QALICBs. Given the wide variety of types of projects NMTCs can be 
applied to, as well as the wide variety of LIC wants and needs, some aspects of community 
impact can be better evaluated qualitatively than strictly quantitatively. A project like the Holy  
Cross school in New Orleans exemplifies the importance of considering local context in judging 
community impact—a private school in what was, before Katrina, a relatively affluent 
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neighborhood might appear on the surface to be a poor investment choice in terms of alleviating 
poverty distress, but the devastating effects of flooding in the area and the enthusiastic support of 
residents attempting to rebuild the surrounding neighborhoods have made the project one of the 
district’s most positive recovery stories.
Not only do CDEs have many diverse options for investments, they also have diverse 
parters who influence their decision making. How CDEs balance the needs of communities, 
investors, and developers is an important factor in their project selection. Prior to project 
selection, the only community accountability requirements for CDEs are to primarily serve LICs,  
and to have LIC representatives on their advisory boards: whether and how CDEs engage 
communities is an important consideration in gauging the success of NMTCs in addressing LIC 
needs. Being a highly investor-driven program, how CDEs work with their investors is another 
key issue. While the competitiveness of the allocation rounds may encourage CDEs to commit to 
census tracts with higher distress levels than the program requires, the bias seen in New Orleans 
towards the CBD and other lightly flooded or unflooded areas raises the question of whether 
some areas or some types of projects are deemed too risky by investors, regardless of the 
individual CDE’s chosen focus or mission. The role played by developers in bring NMTC 
projects to fruition has received very little attention in the literature, but with the prevalence of  
real estate investments (whether in real estate or non-real estate QALICBs), how different CDEs 
work with developers is yet another critical issue that could begin to be elucidated with in-depth 
case studies.
As the NMTC program matures and there are more projects underway in New Orleans 
and across the country to analyze, as well as improved qualitative and quantitative data on 
community impact, it may be possible to hone the program to better define LICs and what best 
serves targeted populations, to recognize strengths and weaknesses of different types of CDEs 
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and evaluate their allocation applications accordingly, and to balance the interests of investors,  
developers, and community residents. While the program appears to be bringing investment to 
businesses that might not have found adequate financing otherwise, New Orleans’ cases 
demonstrate that more work still needs to be done to reach neighborhoods beyond downtown, 
and to promote the city’s coordinated recovery efforts.
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